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Fictitious Commodities: A Theory of 
Intellectual Property Inspired by Karl 
Polanyi’s “Great Transformation” 
Alexander Peukert* 
The puzzle this Article addresses is this: how can it be explained 
that intellectual property (IP) laws and IP rights (IPRs) have 
continuously grown in number and expanded in scope, territorial 
reach, and duration, while at the same time have been contested, 
much more so than other branches of property law? This Article 
offers an explanation for this peculiar dynamic by applying insights 
and concepts of Karl Polanyi’s book “The Great Transformation” 
to IP. It reconstructs and then applies core Polanyian concepts of 
commodification (infra, II), fictitious commodities (infra, III), and 
countermovements (infra, IV) to the three main areas of IP, namely 
copyrights, patents, and trademarks, as they have evolved and are 
currently regulated in international and selected national laws. The 
analysis reveals that the history of IP can be told in terms of 
Polanyi’s famous “double movement”: efforts to commodify 
virtually every reproducible input/output face equally persistent 
opposition, which points out the disruption that IPRs inflict upon 
communication and competition. Whereas IPRs dis-embed 
informational artefacts from the uninterrupted flow of societal 
exchange and subject them to prior authorization requirements, IP 
countermovements call for their re-embedding, i.e. their usability 
irrespective of authorization. From a normative perspective, a 
Polanyian perspective on IP suggests that IP law and policy should 
ensure that market-based transactions coexist with non-market 
modes of accessing and sharing information so that authors, 
inventors, and other entrepreneurs have as many options as possible 
 
* Professor Dr. iur., Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, a.peukert@jur.uni-
frankfurt.de. 
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at hand, and all members of society possess adequate possibilities 
to acquire knowledge. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The puzzle this Article addresses is this: how is it that 
intellectual property (IP) laws and IP rights (IPRs) have 
continuously grown in number and expanded in scope, territorial 
reach, and duration, while at the same time have been contested, 
much more so than other branches of property law? Examples of this 
cleavage between exclusivity and access interests are manifold. 
Reference can be made to 18th century battles between metropolitan 
and provincial publishers over copyright,1 to the 19th century free 
trade critique of patents,2 to 20th century debates about the adequacy 
of IP protection in developing countries,3 and to 21st century 
discussions about the relationship between IP and public health4 or 
between copyright and access in the digital age.5 During all these 
 
1 BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 9 (1999); RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 221 
(2004). Louis d’Héricourt’s memorandum (1725–1726), PRIMARY SOURCES ON 
COPYRIGHT, http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=record_
f_1725b [https://perma.cc/6LJD-GVAU] (U.K.) (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). See generally 
LUDWIG GIESEKE, VOM PRIVILEG ZUM URHEBERRECHT (1995). 
2 CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 68, 203 (1988) 
(U.K.); GABRIEL GALVEZ-BEHAR, LA RÉPUBLIQUE DES INVENTEURS 29 (2008) (Fr.). See 
generally ERICH SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS (1971) (Switz. 
& Neth.); MARGRIT SECKELMANN, INDUSTRIALISIERUNG, INTERNATIONALISIERUNG UND 
PATENTRECHT IM DEUTSCHEN REICH 1871–1914, at 81–82 (2006). 
3 See Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property and Development—Narratives and their 
Empirical Validity, 20 WORLD INTELL. PROP. J. 2 (2017). Cf. Marianne Levin, The 
Pendulum Keeps Swinging – Present Discussions on and Around the TRIPS Agreement, 
INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYS. 3, 5 (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin 
eds., 2011) (discussing the continuing debates of IP protection in developing countries). 
4 Cf. William W. Fisher III & Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS Controversy 
– A Case Study in Patent Law and Policy, HARV. L. SCH. (Feb. 10, 2005), 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB2W-
VR7H]; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO 
Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2002); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (with final act, annexes and protocol), concluded at Marrakesh on 15 April 
1994, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), establishing an Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], 
art. 31bis; Panel Report, Australia – Certain Trademark Concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco 
Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS 458/R, WT/DS467/R 
(Jun. 28, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/435_441_458_467r_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/93Q4-J7ME]. 
5 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 128 (2001). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
FREE CULTURE (2004); SARA BANNERMAN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND ACCESS TO 
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times, the justification of IPRs was called into question. Still, and 
irrespective of rigorous and serious critiques, the political and legal 
dynamic often resulted in a confirmation of the status quo of IP 
protection, if not its further expansion.6  
This Article offers an explanation for this peculiar dynamic by 
applying insights and concepts of Karl Polanyi’s book “The Great 
Transformation” to IP.7 According to the subtitle of this classical 
study of economic history, published in 1944, Polanyi’s aim was to 
understand the “political and economic origins of our time,” i.e. a 
time when WWII was still raging. In a nutshell, he claimed that the 
catastrophes of the 20th century can be explained by the rise and fall 
of the market economy in the 19th century. To substantiate this 
claim, he provides a detailed economic history of how the core 
production factors of the industrial age—labor, land, and money—
were transformed into tradeable commodities in the United 
Kingdom, and which self-protective measures British society seized 
in order to re-embed the “satanic mill” of the autonomous laissez-
 
KNOWLEDGE (2016); SEBASTIAN HAUNSS, Conflicts in the Knowledge Society (2013); 
EDWARD LEE, THE FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE: HOW PEOPLE DEFEATED HOLLYWOOD AND 
SAVED THE INTERNET — FOR NOW (2013); COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCEPTIONS (Ruth L. Okediji ed., 2017). 
6 For example, the Association of German Jurists rejected a proposal made by Professor 
Ohly to repeal the related rights in simple, non-original photographs (§ 72 German 
Copyright Act), and in press publications (§§ 87(f)–(h) German Copyright Act). See 
Deutscher Juristentag – Beschlüsse 26, DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG E.V., (2016) 
https://www.djt.de/fileadmin/downloads/70/djt_70_Beschluesse_141202.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LNL2-DST3] (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). The EU legislature likewise 
rejected a proposal by the European Commission to reduce the scope of trademark law and 
overrule the CJEU to the effect that regarding cases of double identity and well-known 
marks only the traditional origin function of trademarks and trademark law ought to be 
relevant. Cf. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to 
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks (Recast), COM 
(2013) 162 final (Mar. 2, 2013), with Directive 2015/2436, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 
recital 16, 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 3 [hereinafter EUTMDir 2015/2436]. 
7 See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2d ed. 2001). For a general introduction to Polanyi’s writings and 
life see, e.g., GARETH DALE, KARL POLANYI – A LIFE ON THE LEFT (2016); GARETH DALE, 
RECONSTRUCTING KARL POLANYI (2016). 
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faire market into a society in which humans, nature, and economic 
exchange can sustainably flourish.8 
Irrespective of the validity of Polanyi’s concrete historical 
argument, the terminology and concepts employed in the “Great 
Transformation” proved to be very fruitful and influential. Among 
economic sociologists, for example, “few would disagree with the 
statement ‘We are all Polanyians now.’”9 Countless publications in 
various fields of the humanities rely on Polanyi’s theories of 
commodification, of diametrical countermovements, and of an 
economy that is more or less embedded in society at large, and apply 
these concepts to all sorts of countries, economies, commodities, 
and points in time, in particular to processes of globalization and the 
most recent financial crisis.10  
Surprisingly, however, IP does not feature prominently among 
Polanyians. Polanyi himself did not address the issue, which is 
understandable in light of the accessory role that copyrights, patents, 
and trademarks played in the analogue, industrial economy in the 
middle of the 20th century.11 In a post-industrial economy 4.0, 
however, where computerization, digital networks, 3D printing, 
robotics, and biotechnology herald a (near)-zero-marginal-cost 
society of abundant goods and services, information/knowledge 
advances to become the single most important production factor.12 
 
8 See 3 RICHARD THURNWALD, DIE MENSCHLICHE GESELLSCHAFT IN IHREN ETHNO-
SOZIOLOGISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN 44–45 (1932) (explaining embeddedness of economic 
spheres in a given society).  
9 Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New 
Economic Sociology, in MARKET AND SOCIETY: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION TODAY 38, 
40 (Chris Hann & Keith Hart eds., 2009). 
10 See, e.g., FRED BLOCK, THEORY AND SOCIETY 1 (2003); MARKET AND SOCIETY: THE 
GREAT TRANSFORMATION TODAY (Chris Hann & Keith Hart eds., 2009); GARETH DALE, 
KARL POLANYI: THE LIMITS OF THE MARKET (2010); Sabine Frerichs, Polanyi in an 
Hourglass: The Two Lives of a Sociological Classic, in FROM ECONOMY TO SOCIETY? 
PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSNATIONAL RISK REGULATION 25 (Bettina Lange et al. eds., 2013); 
see also information and references available at KARL POLANYI INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMY, http://www.concordia.ca/research/polanyi.html [https://perma.cc/3A5N-
UDHV] (last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
11 ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
CAPITALISM 14 (1990). 
12 For an early account, see PETER DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 5 (1993); see 
also JENS BECKERT, GRENZEN DES MARKTES 78 (1997); and lately JEREMY RIFKIN, THE 
ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE 
1156         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1151 
 
And, with the significance of information grows the importance of 
IPRs. For only if the implementation of ubiquitous copying 
machines requires prior authorization and a corresponding payment 
of royalties will providers of goods and services be able to charge a 
price above marginal costs, which will otherwise approach zero. 
Whereas commentators differ in their normative assessment of this 
scenario, all agree that the future of market capitalism in the digital 
age hinges to a large extent on the question of whether IPRs will be 
effectively enforced, further strengthened, or, alternatively, scaled 
back or perhaps even abolished.13 
In spite of this growing importance of IPRs for current 
capitalism, to my knowledge, no comprehensive application of 
Polanyian concepts to IP has been undertaken yet. Social scientists 
generally do not complement their economic, social, and historical 
studies with detailed considerations of the law, although Polanyi 
stresses and shows in detail that the market economy in the UK was 
established through legal measures.14 The contribution most closely 
on point is Bob Jessop’s article, “Knowledge as a fictitious 
commodity,” in which Jessop refines Polanyi’s core concept—the 
notion of the fictitious commodity—with respect to IP but fails to 
 
COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM 4 (2015); PAUL MASON, POSTCAPITALISM: A 
GUIDE TO OUR FUTURE 117 (2015); Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 460 (2015). 
13 Accordingly, outlooks vary. Some believe more commodification and “global 
network capitalism” will follow. See MATTHEW DAVID & DEBORA HALBERT, OWNING THE 
WORLD OF IDEAS 94 (2015); Primavera De Filippi & Miguel Said Viera, The 
Commodification of Information Commons: The Case of Cloud Computing, 16 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 102 (2014); David Lametti, The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential 
or Enclosure 3.0?, 17 VA. J. L. & TECH. 190 (2012). Some anticipate IPRs will become 
“useless” or so reduced in scope and number that the capitalist market will shrink to the 
edges of the economy. See RIFKIN, supra note 12, at 6, 218; Lemley, supra note 12, at 460. 
Others forecast IPRs will be abolished so that a communist society can be established. See 
MASON, supra note 12, at 279–80. 
14 See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 91; Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Reading the Story of Law 
and Embeddedness Through a Community Lens: A Polanyi-Meets-Cotterrell Economic 
Sociology of Law, 62 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 401 (2011). See also KARL POLANYI, GLOBALISATION 
AND THE POTENTIAL OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS (Christian Joerges & Josef Falke 
eds., 2011) and the contributions to Special Issue: Towards an Economic Sociology of Law, 
40 J.L. & SOC’Y (2013). 
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complement this claim with a legal analysis.15 Legal academics, in 
turn, talk a lot about commodification and second and third 
“enclosure movements” with regard to IP but fail to integrate these 
allusions into the much richer theoretical framework that the “Great 
Transformation” offers.16 In a recent article on “Property and the 
Construction of the Information Economy,” Julie Cohen takes up 
this task, but she does not focus on the dynamic evolution of IP as it 
stands today. Instead, she tells a more forward-looking story about 
the propertization of intangible resources, the dematerialization of 
the basic factors of industrial production, and the embedding of 
patterns of barter and exchange within information platforms, all of 
which contribute to the emergence of what she calls “informational 
capitalism.”17 
Compared to this agenda, this Article pursues a more modest and 
also conventional aim. It reconstructs and then applies core 
Polanyian concepts of commodification in Part I, fictitious 
commodities in Part II, and countermovements in Part III to the three 
main areas of IP, namely copyrights, patents, and trademarks, as 
they have evolved and are currently regulated in international, EU, 
 
15 See Bob Jessop, Knowledge as a Fictitious Commodity: Insights and Limits of 
Polanyian Analysis, in READING KARL POLANYI FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: MARKET 
ECONOMY AS A POLITICAL PROJECT 115, 
http://gerusija.com/downloads/Karl%20Polanyi%20for%20the%2021Century%20Market
%20Economy%20as%20a%20Political%20Project.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QD4-FJV5] 
(Ayşe Buğra & Kaan Ağartan eds., 2007). Jessop’s concepts have been applied by 
ELISABETH ABERGEL & CLAIRE LAGIER, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION OF THE GMO 
LABELING DEBATE IN THE ERA OF NEW PLANT BREEDING TECHNIQUES (2017). 
16 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 34 (2003); Lametti, supra note 13, at 190; THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 
2002); Rosemary J. Coombe, Commodity Culture, Private Censorship, Branded 
Environments, and Global Trade Politics: Intellectual Property as a Topic of Law and 
Society Research, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO L. AND SOC. RES. 369 (Austin Sarat 
ed., 2004); Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: 
How International Law is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
557, 560 (2015). 
17 Julie E. Cohen, Property and the Construction of the Information Economy: A Neo-
Polanyian Ontology, in HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL MEDIA AND COMM. (Leah Lievrouw & 
Brian Loader eds.), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2991271 [https://perma.cc/N9JQ-
UFLT] (posted Jun. 26, 2017). 
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and selected national laws.18 The overall purpose of this necessarily 
abstract effort is first and foremost a descriptive one, namely to 
better understand the exceptional dynamic that characterizes IP law 
in comparison to real property law. In the conclusion, I will also 
articulate some normative implications. These prescriptive 
conclusions will, however, not only be relatively thin, but 
moreover—in contrast to Karl Polanyi and most if not all of his 
followers—not motivated by a particularly “critical” attitude 
towards markets or capitalism in general. To the contrary, I believe 
that competitive markets dispose of greater input and output 
legitimacy than any other economic system that has been tried in the 
past, including crypto-socialist “third ways” and extremist 
countermovements.19 This preoccupation with the market does not, 
however, in any way diminish the conceptual richness of Karl 
Polanyi’s “Great Transformation,” which provides many important 
insights into the functioning of the market, its role in modern 
society, and the resistance it constantly faces. 
I. COMMODIFICATION 
The first element of Polanyi’s theory that merits attention is his 
powerful explanation of seemingly natural processes in which 
practically every resource and human capacity is turned into a 
tradeable commodity. 
 
18 See generally Alexander Peukert, Die Expansion des Urheberrechts – eine 
polanyische Perspektive, in VOM MAGNETTONBAND ZU SOCIAL MEDIA – FESTSCHRIFT 50 
JAHRE URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ (URHG) 305 (Thomas Dreier & Reto Hilty eds., 2015) 
(regarding the expansion of German copyright law); see also Alexander Peukert, Vom 
Warenzeichen zum Markeneigentum. Ein polanyischer Erklärungsversuch, in 
MARKTKOMMUNIKATION ZWISCHEN GEISTIGEM EIGENTUM UND VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ – 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL-HEINZ FEZER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 405 (Wolfgang Büscher et al. 
eds., 2016) (regarding the evolution of German and EU trademark law). 
19 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960), https://
iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/Hayek's%20Constitution%20of%20Liberty
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RMU6-7H5M] (last visited Jan. 30, 2019); Franz Böhm, 
Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft, 17 JAHRBUCH FÜR DIE ORDNUNG VON 
WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT [ORDO] 75 (1966); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION 
AND INCENTIVES 97 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual 
Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 
520 (2010); ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (2011). 
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A. Polanyi on Machines and the Formation of the Market 
Economy 
Polanyi attributes the initial impulse towards this process to the 
invention and implementation of new technologies enabling large-
scale industrial production. He does not assert that technological 
progress constitutes the sole cause of the Great Transformation but 
still observes “that[,] once elaborate machines and plant were used 
for production in a commercial society, the idea of a self-regulating 
market was bound to take shape.”20 The reason for the crucial role 
of the move from craftsmen’s tools to machines like the steam 
engine is this: 
Since elaborate machines are expensive, they do not 
pay unless large amounts of goods are produced. 
They can be worked without a loss only if the vent of 
the goods is reasonably assured and if production 
need not be interrupted for want of the primary goods 
necessary to feed the machines. For the merchant this 
means that all factors involved must be on sale, that 
is, they must be available in the needed quantities to 
anybody who is prepared to pay for them. Unless this 
condition is fulfilled, production with the help of 
specialized machines is too risky to be undertaken 
both from the point of view of the merchant who 
stakes his money and of the community as a whole 
which comes to depend upon continuous production 
for incomes, employment, and provisions.21 
As a consequence, 
All transactions are turned into money transactions, 
and these in turn require that a medium of exchange 
be introduced into every articulation of industrial 
life. All incomes must derive from the sale of 
something or other, and whatever the actual source 
 
20 See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 25. 
21 Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
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of a person’s income, it must be regarded as resulting 
from sale.22 
In such a self-regulating market system, 
there are markets for all elements of industry, not 
only for goods (always including services) but also 
for labor, land, and money, their prices being called 
respectively commodity prices, wages, rent, and 
interest. The very terms indicate that prices form 
incomes: interest is the price for the use of money 
and forms the income of those who are in the position 
to provide it; rent is the price for the use of land and 
forms the income of those who supply it; wages are 
the price for the use of labor power, and form the 
income of those who sell it; commodity prices, 
finally, contribute to the incomes of those who sell 
their entrepreneurial services, the income called 
profit being actually the difference between two sets 
of prices, the price of the goods produced and their 
costs, i.e., the price of the goods necessary to produce 
them. If these conditions are fulfilled, all incomes 
will derive from sales on the market, and incomes 
will be just sufficient to buy all the goods produced.23 
This, according to Polanyi, is the essence of what we call the 
“market system” and, at the same time the seemingly natural 
“satanic mill” of commodification of each and every production 
factor.24 It implies “a change in the motive of action on the part of 
the members of society: for the motive of subsistence that of gain 
must be substituted.”25 In a pure market economy, there is no 
alternative to the profit motive if you want to survive.26 
This observation seems to imply that commodification and 
marketization are quasi-natural phenomena. Social institutions, 
including the dominant mode of economic exchange, are, however, 
 
22 Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
23 Id. at 39–40. 
24 See id. at 19. 
25 See id. at 22. 
26 See id. at 24. 
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always contingent creations of collective human intentionality.27 
Polanyi thus rightly stresses that 
[t]here was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free 
markets could never have come into being merely by 
allowing things to take their course. Just as cotton 
manufactures – the leading free trade industry – were 
created by the help of protective tariffs, export 
bounties, and indirect wage subsidies, laissez-faire 
itself was enforced by the state.28 
The measures that put the Great Transformation into effect were 
legal measures. Polanyi shows in quite some detail the means 
through which changes in the law, labor, land, and money as the 
major production factors of the industrial age became tradeable 
commodities in early 19th century Britain.29 In particular, the British 
legislature abolished privileges and laws that prevented the free sale 
of labor and land.30 At the core of these legal developments lies the 
property issue, which, in Polanyi’s words, “is the legal aspect only 
of capitalism”:31 “[w]hile the actual content of property rights might 
undergo redefinition at the hands of legislation, assurance of formal 
continuity is essential to the functioning of the market system.”32 
B. New Technologies and Intellectual Property 
To support my assertion that Polanyi’s theory of 
commodification is informative for IP, it will be necessary to show 
that certain complex machines triggered a demand for property 
rights in inventions, works, and other subject matter of today’s IP 
system. On a general level, it is indeed widely acknowledged that IP 
law can be conceived of as a reaction to technological change or, 
 
27 See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 114 (1995); RAIMO TUOMELA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
SOCIALITY: THE SHARED POINT OF VIEW (2007). 
28 POLANYI, supra note 7, at 80. 
29 See DALE, supra note 10, at 208. 
30 See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 79. 
31 See id. at 99. 
32 See id. at 134. 
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more precisely, the development of reproduction technologies.33 To 
further disentangle the complex relationship between technology, 
the market, and IP law, it is useful to distinguish the initial 
propertization of information by the first modern IP laws in history 
(1) from later expansions of this body of law (2).34 
1. Printing and Other New Technologies in Early Modern 
Times 
The “elaborate” and expensive machines that triggered the move 
towards property rights in abstract IP objects were wind mills, 
drainage systems for mining, and, last but not least, the printing 
press.35 The former technologies were key for the reclamation of 
land, agricultural production, and the exploitation of silver and other 
valuable metal at a scale never achieved before in Europe.36 The 
latter technology of mass communication eventually transformed 
stratified feudal/absolutist script societies into functionally 
differentiated modern societies.37 Since the invention, improvement, 
and employment of all those machines required significant 
investments, Polanyi’s theory suggests that the respective providers, 
at one point in time, demanded exclusive property rights in order to 
be able to generate income based on sales. 
At first sight, history seems to cast doubt on this hypothesis. 
Both the invention and proliferation of the mentioned technologies 
 
33 See Martin Kretschmer, Copyright and its Discontents, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
CREATIVE AND CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 456 (Candace Jones et al. eds., 2015) (“a purely 
technological reflex appeared to drive the evolution of copyright law”); COPYRIGHT AND 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW (Brad Sherman & Leanne Wiseman eds., 2012); HERBERT 
ZECH, INFORMATION ALS SCHUTZGEGENSTAND 167 (2012). 
34 Cf. Katarzyna Gracz, Opposing the Expansion of Copyright Law: Social Norms in the 
Quest against ACTA and the “Commodification of Knowledge and Culture Project,” in 
EXPANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
EUROPE AND BEYOND 267 (Hannes Siegrist & Augusta Dimou eds., 2017). 
35 See ALEXANDER PEUKERT, KRITIK DER ONTOLOGIE DES IMMATERIALGÜTERRECHTS 74 
(2018). 
36 RIFKIN, supra note 12, at 39; Christopher May, The Venetian Moment: New 
Technologies, Legal Innovation and the Institutional Origins of Intellectual Property, 20 
PROMETHEUS 159 (2002). 
37 See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 
(2012); WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY 129 (2012) (“Typography had made the 
word into a commodity.”); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, GUTENBERG GALAXY: THE MAKING OF 
THE TYPOGRAPHIC MAN 142 (1962).  
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as well as the earliest laws concerning the use of new machines 
(Venice 1477, England 1624) and the printing of books (UK 1710) 
predate the formation of the market economy, which Polanyi dates 
to the first half of the 19th century, by decades, even centuries.38 It 
thus appears that the relationship between technological progress 
and propertization is much less straightforward than Polanyi 
presumed, if it exists at all. 
Polanyi is, however, clear about the fact that the Great 
Transformation was the result of a very long line of events predating 
the paradigm shift of the 19th century. He notes, for example, that 
the “[c]ottage industry was spreading by the second half of the 
fifteenth century” and that, “[f]rom the sixteenth century onwards[,] 
markets were both numerous and important. Under the mercantile 
system they became, in effect, a main concern of government. . . .”39 
Nevertheless, during all those centuries, “there was still no sign 
of the coming control of markets over human society. On the 
contrary. Regulation and regimentation were stricter than ever; the 
very idea of a self-regulating market was absent.”40 This observation 
also proves true for the area of interest here. Wind mills, mining 
technologies, and the printing press were not immediately regulated 
by freely transferable property rights but for a long time by 
privileges. The privilege was the regulatory instrument that allowed 
absolutist rulers to incentivize and protect private initiative and 
investment but at the same time retain control over the use of new, 
powerful technologies. Privileges were granted on a case-by-case 
basis to loyal subjects or immigrants and employed as a tool of 
mercantilist control and censorship. Through the privilege, the 
printing press and other elaborate machines were integrated into a 
strictly controlled economy, which in turn was embedded in a 
stratified feudal society. 
The 1477 statute of Venice, the 1624 Statute of Monopolies, and 
the 1710 Statute of Anne are doubtlessly important steps in the 
movement from privilege to property and thus from an embedded 
mercantilist economy to a self-regulating capitalist market. Legal 
 
38 See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 19. 
39 See id. at 19, 32. 
40 Id. at 58; DALE, supra note 10, at 80. 
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historians point out, however, that these statutes were still firmly 
grounded in the early modern privilege system, most notably 
because they do not grant property rights in abstract, intangible 
“inventions” or “works.” Instead, they regulate who is entitled to 
make “new manufacture” or “print books.”41 
The transformation of these activities and artefacts into 
commodified abstract works, inventions, and other IP only occurred 
in the late 18th and early 19th century. Before this point of time, the 
notion of abstract IP objects—“the” work, “the” invention, etc.—
was either “unthinkable”42 or considered a “wild” proposition.43 The 
political, economic, and conceptual difficulties of the move from 
privileges to act in a stratified society to individual intellectual 
property rights exchangeable on an anonymous market can be 
observed, for example, in the long and fiercely fought battles of the 
booksellers in 18th century Britain, France, and Germany.44 The 
more efficient printing and re-printing technologies became and the 
more market transactions replaced feudal systems of patronage and 
privilege, the more it became evident that publishers, authors, and 
inventors require some kind of property right that enables them to 
recoup their sunk investments in the first prototype, e.g. a 
manuscript of a book. Using the example of the German printing 
industry, this shift can even be pinpointed to a particular year and 
event, namely to 1764, when the then leading Leipzig publishers 
switched from a barter trade in books to the sale of their production. 
As a consequence of this business decision, the complete German 
book sector had to be restructured to the effect that all exchanges 
 
41 Regarding patent law, see MACLEOD, supra note 2, at 80, 203; Oren Bracha, Owning 
Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intell. Prop., UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
SCHOOL OF LAW 530 (June 2005), https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/obracha/dissertation/ 
[https://perma.cc/96K8-4VR6]. Regarding copyright law, see SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra 
note 1, at 17; Friedemann Kawohl & Martin Kretschmer, Abstraction and Registration: 
Conceptual Innovations and Supply Effects in Prussian and British Copyright (1820–50), 
2 INTELL. PROP. QUARTERLY 209, 212 (2003) (“Eighteenth century copyright was practised 
as the sale of a manuscript from author to publisher against a one-off fee, and litigation 
between competing publishers.”); DEAZLEY, supra note 1, at 221; Anne Barron, Copyright 
Law’s Musical Work, 15 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 101, 106 (2006). 
42 Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became 
Rights and why we Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 219 (2004). 
43 Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 4 Burrow 2303, 2357 (Yates, J.). 
44 See PEUKERT, supra note 35. 
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became money exchanges, including the contract between the 
author and the publisher regarding a particular “work” that was then 
produced and distributed in a certain number of “copies.”45 
The French revolutionary patent and copyright acts of 
1791/1793 present the first full legal implementation of the new 
paradigm and at the same time the conceptual point of no return.46 
From here, the idea that authors and inventors own 
intangible/intellectual goods and sell them on the market spread 
around the globe.47 During the course of their still solidifying 
commodification, the evaluation of works and inventions became 
more and more detached from arguments of traditional aesthetics 
and public benefits. In the end, the only relevant value remaining 
was the market-conception of value: every use value, however 
motivated or characterized, has to translate into an exchange value. 
Thus, what is worth copying is worth protecting by tradeable 
property rights.48 
2. Later Technological Development 
Once the market is established as the dominant mode of 
economic exchange, it tends to absorb every new technology. All 
input into a new technology—in particular the sunk costs into 
research and development—and all of its output have to be up for 
sale because there is, in general, no other way to recoup investments 
and generate income.49 
 
45 HELMUTH KIESEL & PAUL MÜNCH, GESELLSCHAFT UND LITERATUR IM 18. 
JAHRHUNDERT 124 (1977). 
46 HEINRICH BOSSE, AUTORSCHAFT IST WERKHERRSCHAFT 100, 107 (2014) [1981]. 
47 Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property: The Global Spread of Legal Concept 1, 
KRITIKA: ESSAYS ON INTELL. PROP. 114 (Peter Drahos et al. eds., 2015). 
48 Regarding inventions see Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817); 
Bracha, supra note 42, at 233. Regarding works of art, see Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903) (“Yet if they command the interest of any 
public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to say that they have not an 
aesthetic and educational value—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with 
contempt.”); Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making 
of American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2017). Regarding trademarks, see 
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 400–12 (1990). Critique: ALEXANDER PEUKERT, 
GÜTERZUORDNUNG ALS RECHTSPRINZIP 733–90 (2008). 
49 See DAN SCHILLER, HOW TO THINK ABOUT INFORMATION 21 (2010). 
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The history of IP from the 19th to the 21st century is replete with 
examples of this Polanyian logic of commodification: musical 
compositions attained the status of objects of property only after the 
mass production of sheet music created the impression that music is 
more akin to written texts than to ephemeral performances on 
stage.50 The thingification of paintings, sculptures, and other works 
of fine art took even longer. It was not until industrial remakes of 
three- and two-dimensional products flooded the market in the late 
19th century that these artefacts were also idealized as abstract 
industrial designs or works of (applied) art and allocated to their first 
producers.51 In Germany, this was also the time when large research 
laboratories, for example, in the chemical industry, were 
established, giving rise to claims for efficient patent protection for 
the inventions ensuing from these organizations.52 Technologies of 
fixing and reproducing sounds and (moving) images triggered 
several 20th century copyrights and related rights in audio 
performances, phonograms, photographs, films, and broadcasting 
signals, all of which cost money to produce but are easily 
reproduced without payment.53 Computerization and digitization 
generalized and amplified this phenomenon, leading to extended 
exclusive rights in all existing copyright subject matter and to new 
subject matter such as computer programs, databases, and press 
publications.54 New IP rights in layout designs (topographies) of 
integrated circuits and the application of patent law to computer-
 
50 See Bach v. Longman (1777), in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT, http://
www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/pdf/uk_1777_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ATU-QK82] (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2018); Friedemann Kawohl & Martin Kretschmer, Abstraction & 
Registration: Conceptual Innovations and Supply Effects in Prussian and British 
Copyright (1820–50), 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 209, 214 (2003) https://
core.ac.uk/download/pdf/76740.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FLN-5GFG]; Anne Barron, 
Copyright Law’s Musical Work, 15 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 101, 119 (2006). 
51 See STINA TEILMANN-LOCK, THE OBJECT OF COPYRIGHT 120–21 (2017). 
52 See SECKELMANN, supra note 2, at 405. 
53 See PEUKERT, supra note 35; Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 33; JONATHAN STERNE, 
THE AUDIBLE PAST 23 (2003); BERNARD EDELMAN, OWNERSHIP OF THE IMAGE (1979); 
Anne Barron, The Legal Properties of Film, 67 MOD. L. REV. 177, 181 (2004); William 
Cornish, Conserving Culture and Copyright: A Partial History, 13 EDINBURGH L. REV. 8 
(2009). 
54 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 10; GESETZ ÜBER URHEBERRECHT UND 
VERWANDTE SCHUTZRECHTE [URHG] [GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL I at 
1273, last amended by Gesetz [G], Sept. 1, 2017, BGBL. I at 3346, art. 1, §§ 87f-h. 
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implemented and biotechnological inventions can also be explained 
as measures to integrate these technologies into the capitalist market 
economy.55 
In contrast to patents, copyrights, and other IP rights in 
innovations, trademarks do not attach to and thus commodify new 
technologies. Instead, trademark law grants exclusive rights in the 
use of distinctive signs in the course of trade, irrespective of whether 
that trade concerns new or traditional types of goods and services.56 
The history of trademark law is nonetheless also closely tied to 
technological progress and innovative marketing practices resulting 
therefrom. Before industrialization, goods and services were 
primarily distinguished and identified by their characteristics and/or 
their place of production.57 If fanciful signs were attached to 
products, their use was strictly regulated by guilds and other 
organizations embedded in a stratified society.58 With the 
emergence of the competitive market, this economic order lost its 
significance. Early industrialists employed new signs indicating 
their name or their location (e.g. Worchester Sauce). Though dis-
embedded from medieval practices, these signs retained an 
accessory role. Their purpose was to support the sale of a product 
that constituted the primary commodity. They had not yet acquired 
the status of a separate commodity.59 
 
55 See generally WIPO, Treaty on Intell. Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, 
I.L.M. 1477 (1989); Nari Lee, Patent Eligible of Business Subject Matter Reconfiguration 
and the Emergence of Proprietarian Norms – The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 
45 IDEA 321, 321 (2005); Jessica C. Lai, A Tale of Two Histories: The ‘Invention’ and Its 
Incentive Theory, in INTELL.PROP.AND ACCESS TO IMMATERIAL GOODS 94, 119 (Jessica C. 
Lai & Antoinette Maget Dominicé eds., 2016); Mario Biagioli, Between Knowledge And 
Technology: Patenting Methods, Rethinking Materiality, 22 ANTHROPOLOGICAL F. 285, 
289–90 (2012). 
56 See Cohen, supra note 17, at 5–6. 
57 See Gary Richardson, Brand Names before the Industrial Revolution (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1390, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13930.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MGF-UXND]. 
58 KARL-HEINZ FEZER, MARKENRECHT, Einleitung in das deutsche, europäische und 
internationale Marken- und Kennzeichenrecht, para. 17 (4th ed. 2009). 
59 See Paul Duguid, Early Marks: American Trademarks Before US Trademark Law, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2016.1246541 [https://perma.cc/5JFT-3FAC] (2016) 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018). 
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This abstraction only occurred in reaction to further changes in 
production and marketing, both again related to technological 
development. In the late 19th century, consumer goods started to be 
produced at massive industrial scales. They were shipped to 
institutional dealers and sold to consumers at places far away from 
the production site. In order to allow consumers to distinguish and 
remember goods under conditions of such anonymous production 
and consumption, entrepreneurs like Karl August Lingner from 
Dresden invented fanciful brand names (“Warenzeichen”) such as 
“Odol,” which identified the product, not a particular producer or 
place of production.60 Already in the early 20th century, the creation 
of such a brand image was considered a costly input into capitalist 
production that merited protection against free-riders, even absent a 
risk of confusion on the part of the consumer.61 But only after further 
technological advancements had allowed capitalist societies to 
proceed to an affluent society where “wants are increasingly created 
by the process by which they are satisfied”62 did trademarks become 
valuable commodities in and of themselves. Under these conditions, 
both producers and consumers require trademarks in order to create 
and satisfy demand for conspicuous consumption and reputational 
distinction.63 The input into the creation of these abstract signifiers, 
 
60 See Lionel A. F. Bently, From Communication to Thing: Historical Aspects of the 
Conceptualization of Trademarks as Property, 1 TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
L. 118, 149 (2014) (U.K.); KAI-UWE HELLMANN, SOZIOLOGIE DER MARKE 46 (2003); Ross 
D. Petty, The Codevelopment of Trademark Law and the Concept of Brand Marketing in 
the United States Before 1946, 31 J. MACROMARKETING 85 (2011). 
61 Landgericht Elberfeld [LG] [regional court] Sept. 11, 1924, 1924 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 204 (204–205); Hermann Isay, Die 
Selbstständigkeit des Rechts der Marke, 1929 GRUR 23, 25; Frank I. Schechter, The 
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 813 (1927); Barton Beebe, 
The Suppressed Misappropriation Origins of Trademark Antidilution Law: The 
Landgericht Elberfeld’s Odol Opinion and Frank Schechter’s The Rational Basis of 
Trademark Protection, in INTELL. PROP. AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2013). 
62 See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 131–37 (1958). 
63 See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 84 (1994) [1899] (“The 
basis on which good repute in any highly organised industrial community ultimately rests 
is pecuniary strength; and the means of showing pecuniary strength, and so of gaining or 
retaining a good name, are leisure and a conspicuous consumption of goods.”); PETER 
CORRIGAN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CONSUMPTION 179 (1997) (“Instead of consuming the 
goods themselves, we consume the meanings of goods as constructed through advertising 
and display  . . .”). 
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in particular for luxury brands, is commodified through 
contemporary trademark law, for example, via the functionality 
doctrine of the CJEU and the doctrine of post-sale confusion.64 
Hardly ever has this continuous commodification and expansion 
of IP law been straightforwardly justified by the need to subject each 
and every factor of supply and demand in a market economy to the 
laws of the market, i.e. to tradeable property rights. The systemic 
role of IPRs is touched upon, however, in the CJEU’s definition of 
the “specific subject-matter” of IPRs, which justifies a restriction of 
fundamental freedoms in the Internal Market. According to this 
definition, IPRs are “intended in particular to ensure for the right 
holders concerned protection of the right to exploit commercially the 
marketing or the making available of the protected subject-matter, 
by the grant of licenses in return for payment of remuneration.”65 
With this complicated definition, the CJEU indeed gets to the 
essence of IP, the purpose of which is to establish an authorization 
requirement that the right holder can exchange for money. In a 
market economy, every input for which there is a demand – even if 
it is a signifier devoid of meaning – ought to be on sale. And the 
purpose of IPRs is just this: propertization for the sake of 
marketization. 
The systemic role of IPRs in a market economy with ubiquitous 
reproduction technologies is also brought to light in IP laws that 
leave their scope of application effectively open. Under EU and 
German law, this is the case for the notion of a copyrightable work 
and the scope of exclusive exploitation rights in these works, the 
 
64 See AIPPI, Q68, Economic significance, functions and purpose of the trademark, 
Yearbook 1979/I, 463–465; ECJ Case C-487/07, L’Oréal v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, 
paras. 49, 58; Dev Saif Gangjee, Property in Brands, in PROP. CONCEPTS IN INTELL. PROP. 
L. (Helena R. Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., 2013), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2249765 [https://perma.cc/VR3Q-
R65M]. 
65 See CJEU Joined Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08, Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. 
and Others v. QC Leisure and Others, Karen Murphy v. Media Protection Services Ltd., 
2011 E.C.R. I-09083 para. 107 (emphasis added). See also Panel Report, United States – 
Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 44–50, WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter 
Section 110(5) Panel Report]. (“These exclusive rights are the legal means by which 
exploitation of the work, i.e., the commercial activity for extracting economic value from 
the rights to the work, can be carried out.”). 
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fields of technology covered by patent law, and the type of signs of 
which a trademark may consist.66 The comprehensive and flexible 
scope of IP laws and rights makes sure that new technological 
possibilities to invent, create, and commercialize artefacts will 
automatically be subject to the central legal feature of the market: 
exclusive property rights. 
Comprehensive propertization furthermore conforms to the 
interests of all market participants who have to be able to exchange 
every productive input and output for money in order to make a 
living. The input/output at stake in IP is the always costly production 
of a first, but easily reproduced, prototype of an invention, of a work, 
and of a brand image. Only if these reproducible “Master Artefacts” 
are recognized as tradeable commodities can their producers 
generate a market-based income.67 Accordingly, IP laws allocate 
IPRs to those who carry the entrepreneurial responsibility for these 
creative or non-creative products, namely to independent authors, 
inventors, designers, or their employers, to phonogram and film 
producers, to broadcasters, to producers of databases, and to the 
(legal) person who has applied for a trademark registration or who 
controls the use of a distinctive sign in the course of trade.68 Their 
privileged position vis-à-vis the world is not justified because of a 
particular personal relationship between them and their work 
product. Only scant subject matter of today’s IP can legitimately be 
said to bear the personal stamp of its creator. Instead, IPRs are 
justified from an individual right-holder’s perspective because it 
would be unjust to subject all these providers of new reproducible 
 
66 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(1) (regarding patent law); Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 641–43 (2010) (regarding the limits under U.S. patent law); 
EUTMDir 2015/2436, supra note 6, art. 3, 2015 O.J. (L 336) 1, 7 (regarding the limits 
under trademark law); GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT §§ 2, 15 (regarding the limits under 
copyright law). 
67 PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21 (1996); Jessop, supra 
note 15, at 121. 
68 Cf. Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) art. 
60, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268 [hereinafter EPC]; Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works art. 2(6), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221  [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]; Council Regulation 6/2002 on Community designs, art. 14, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 
1, 6 (EU) [hereinafter Community Design Regulation]; Regulation 2017/1001, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade 
mark, art. 3, 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1, 7. 
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artefacts to the unforgiving laws of the market but at the same time 
to withhold from them the legal tool they need in order to generate 
income and profit from their efforts. From John Stuart Mill to Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon, market theorists and critics agree that “it would 
be a gross immorality in the law to set everybody free to use a 
person’s work without his consent, and without giving him an 
equivalent.”69 Taken to their extremes, the systemic and 
individualistic arguments for IPRs justify the establishment of IP 
markets for every tiny fragment of information and for every act of 
copying.70 
In an already established market economy, further factors 
amplify this logic of commodification. If one technology of 
reproduction replaces an already commodified one, courts justify 
the expansion of IPRs to the new technology by pointing out that 
other possibilities for market exchanges and individual incomes 
might “erode.”71 On an international scale, knowledge-exporting 
 
69 See Borghi, supra note 15, at 15–16 for further references. inter alia to 5 JOHN STUART 
MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, ch. 10, no. 4 (1848). In this sense on the 
fundamental right to property, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] July 7, 1971, 31 BVERFGE 229 (240–41) – Kirchen- und 
Schulgebrauch; see also Reichsgericht [RG] [Federal Court of Justice until 1945] Apr. 7, 
1910, 73 RGZ 294 (297) (phonogram producer); Rudolf Callmann, Sittenwidrige 
Ausbeutung fremder Arbeit, 1928 GRUR 251, 254; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal 
Court of Justice] May 31, 1960, 1960 GRUR 619 (624) – Künstlerlizenz (principle of 
equivalence of work and reward); BGH May 31, 1960, 1960 GRUR 614 (616) – Figaros 
Hochzeit (it is fair that authors and performers share the income generated from a public 
communication of a recording because both have contributed to its production); BGH Dec. 
10, 1987, 1988 GRUR 308 (310) – Informationsdienst (database producer). See generally 
RG Nov. 14, 1936, 153 RGZ 1 (22) with further references (with justification for the 
continued force of this argument during Nazism). 
70 See BGH Oct. 25, 2012, 115 GRUR 717 para. 26, 41 – Covermount (grant of rights 
irrespective of the accruing exchange value); regarding sound samples and other digital 
fragments see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 792. (2005); but 
see VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (2016). See generally BGH June 1, 2017, 
61 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND MEDIENRECHT [ZUM] 760 (762) para. 18 – Metall auf 
Metall III (even the smallest excerpts are protected); BVerfG May 31, 2016, 69 NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2247 para. 91. – Metall auf Metall. 
71 See, e.g. RG Jan. 31, 1891, 27 RGZ 60 (66) – Clariophon (clariophones equal sheet 
music copies); BGH Feb. 27, 1962, 1962 GRUR 470 (473)– AKI (television to be treated 
like other film exploitation); BGH Nov. 11, 1953, 1954 GRUR 216 (219-20) – Rom-
Fassung (public communication of recordings); BGH May 18, 1955, 1955 GRUR 492 
(497, 499) – Grundig-Reporter (private copy machines); Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. 
1172         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1151 
 
countries have successfully persuaded and pressured other countries 
into some form of IP protection, inter alia with the argument that it 
would be unfair to establish a world market for all types of products, 
but not for IP.72 Finally, commodification via IPRs creates new 
assets that are traded on financial markets that in turn exhibit their 
own demand for ever more tradeable IP commodities/securities.73 
C. Consequence: IP as an End in Itself 
The pervasive systemic and individualistic plea for property in a 
market economy creates the impression that commodification is an 
unavoidable natural process: there is no alternative.74 Exclusive 
exploitation based on IPRs is “normal,” and lawful access without 
prior authorization the exception.75 In the area of IP, this “property 
logic”76 led to a self-referential closure of the IP system, where IPRs 
are no longer considered a tool to achieve an end, for example, to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts77 or to enable 
 
Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (cloud video provider similar to cable TV 
stations); EDELMAN, supra note 53, 35 (photographs equal other copying techniques). 
72 On the spread of IP law among European states and the U.S., see SAM RICKETSON, 
THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROT. OF INDUS. PROP. § 2.13 (2015); SECKELMANN, supra 
note 2, at 156 (US companies demanding patent protection at world exhibitions in Europe 
in the 1870’s); Paul Duguid, French Connections: The International Propagation of 
Trademarks in the Nineteenth Century, 10 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 3 (2009) (France as a first 
mover and exporter of trademark law). On the globalization of IP via colonialism, see 
Alexander Peukert, The Colonial Legacy of the International Copyright System, in 
COPYRIGHT AFRICA. HOW INTELL. PROP., MEDIA AND MARKETS TRANSFORM CULTURAL 
GOODS 37 (Ute Röschenthaler & Mamadou Diawara eds., 2015). On the globalization of 
IP after the fall of the Soviet Union, see SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS (2003). 
73 Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How 
International Law is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 
566 (2015). 
74 See supra notes 20–32 and accompanying text.  
75 See Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 9(2); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 
13, 17, 26(2), 30; WIPO: Copyright Treaty (WCT) art. 10(1), Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65; 
WIPO: Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), art. 16(2), Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 
76 [hereinafter WPPT]; Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, art. 13(2), June 24, 
2012 [hereinafter BTAP]. See generally Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 65, at 44–
50; Christophe Geiger et al., The Three-Step-Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s 
Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L 581 (2014). 
76 See Thomas Dreier, Primär- und Folgemärkte, in GEISTIGES EIGENTUM IM DIENST DER 
INNOVATION 51, 76. (Gerhard Schricker et al. eds., 2001). 
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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economies to benefit from their comparative advantage in producing 
information.78 Instead, they are perceived as principally beneficial 
ends in themselves.79 Thus, the more protection there is, the better.80 
The results of this ideology can be observed, for example, in EU 
IP law. Directives proclaim that a “high level of protection” will 
promote innovation and creativity, improve competitiveness, and 
develop employment.81 The CJEU relies on this aim of establishing 
a high level of protection for an extensive interpretation of the 
acquis.82 The court also uses the three-step test to rule out any 
practice that “reduc[es] the volume of sales or of other lawful 
transactions” and thus adversely affects “normal exploitation.”83 
Since 2009, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides 
additional support for this logic by apodictically proclaiming that 
“Intellectual property shall be protected.” Why?: “[b]ecause of its 
growing importance and Community secondary legislation.”84 
 
78 See generally Keith E. Maskus, Incorporating a Globalized Intellectual Property 
Rights Regime Into an Economic Development Strategy, in INTELL. PROP., GROWTH AND 
TRADE 497 (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008). 
79 See Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property as an End in Itself, 33 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 67, 67–71 (2011). 
80 See Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one 
part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part art. 131(2), 
Oct. 30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289) 3 (the CARIFORUM States and the EU “recognise that 
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property plays a key role in fostering 
creativity, innovation and competitiveness, and are determined to ensure increasing levels 
of protection appropriate to their levels of development”) (emphasis added). 
81 Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, recital 4, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1; Parliament 
and Council Directive 2004/48, recitals 1, 10, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45. 
82 See, e.g., CJEU Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo, ECLI:EU:C:2017:456, para. 
22. 
83 See CJEU Case C-435/12, ACI Adam v. Stichting de Thuiskopie, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:254, paras. 38–39. 
84 See Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, CHARTE 4473/00 
CONVENT 49, Note from the Praesidium – Text of the explanations relating to the 
complete text of the Charter, 19–20, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Oct. 
11, 2000), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GGF5-NXDP]; Christophe Geiger, Intellectual Property Shall be Protected!? Article 17 
(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: a Mysterious Provision 
with an Unclear Scope, 31 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 113 (2009). 
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II. THE FICTITIOUSNESS OF IP 
The IP commodification story has been told many times.85 At 
first sight, equally trivial as this story is the observation that 
commodification is a contingent process. Things could have evolved 
differently. But even this obvious truth is, according to Polanyi, 
overshadowed by an “economistic fallacy” that “equate[s] the 
human economy with its market form.”86 In other words, the market 
has often been conceived of as the only available form of regulating 
the relationship between scarce resources and human wants, i.e. the 
economy. Polanyians stress that this reductionist economic 
determinism is flawed.87 
More interesting and productive than the insistence on 
contingency and thus politics in economic matters is, in my view, 
another concept contained in the “Great Transformation”: the notion 
of the “fictitious commodity.” The study of land, labor, and money 
as “fictitious commodities” constitutes the core of Polanyi’s theory 
because it links commodification processes (supra, II) and 
countermovements (infra, IV) together to form Polanyi’s famous 
“double movement.” This section addresses the question of whether 
and in what sense the tradeable good “IP” constitutes a fiction.88 
A. Polanyi on Fictitious Commodities 
In contrast to Karl Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism, 
Polanyi does not consider invariably every tradeable good or service 
as an obscured power relation.89 Instead, he distinguishes “real” 
commodities from “fictitious” commodities. The first are defined as 
goods or services that are actively and originally “produced for 
sale,” whereas a fictitious commodity is exchanged for money but 
was not actively and purposefully created to this end: 
 
85 For a Marxist reading of the IP expansion see EDELMAN, supra note 53; Ugo Pagano, 
The Crisis of Intellectual Monopoly Capitalism, 38 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1409 (2014); 
Coombe, supra note 16, at  369. 
86 See KARL POLANYI, THE LIVELIHOOD OF MAN 20 (Harry W. Pearson ed., 1977). 
87 See Claus Thomasberger, The Belief in Economic Determinism, Neoliberalism, and 
the Significance of Polanyi’s Contribution in the Twenty-First Century, 41 INT’L J. POL. 
ECON. 16 (2012). 
88 For a conceptual analysis, see Jessop, supra note 15, at 115. 
89 On parallels and differences between Marx and Karl Polanyi, see DALE, supra note 
10, at 241. 
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The crucial point is this: labor, land, and money are 
essential elements of industry; they also must be 
organized in markets; in fact, these markets form an 
absolutely vital part of the economic system. But 
labor, land, and money are obviously not 
commodities; the postulate that anything that is 
bought and sold must have been produced for sale is 
emphatically untrue in regard to them. In other 
words, according to the empirical definition of a 
commodity they are not commodities. Labor is only 
another name for a human activity which goes with 
life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale 
but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity 
be detached from the rest of life, be stored or 
mobilized; land is only another name for nature, 
which is not produced by man; actual money, finally, 
is merely a token of purchasing power which, as a 
rule, is not produced at all, but comes into being 
through the mechanism of banking or state finance. 
None of them is produced for sale. The commodity 
description of labor, land, and money is entirely 
fictitious.90 
In other words, land, labor, and money are treated as if they had 
been produced for sale, although they were either not produced at 
all (like land) or, if so, were not for sale (like labor).91 In contrast to 
traditionally marketed artefacts like food, machines, or books, the 
natural environment (land) and human capabilities (labor) as such 
are not created in a profit-oriented production process subject to the 
competitive pressures of market forces. Instead, they are given or 
are the result of a personal and societal endeavor. The 
transformation these resources underwent in 19th century England 
in order to be exchangeable for money is the “Great 
 
90 POLANYI, supra note 7, at 71 (emphasis in original). 
91 See id. at 10. The fictitiousness of money is of another kind, which will not be further 
elaborated in this article. It concerns the contradiction between, on the one hand, money as 
a societal-institutional fact, and its strict representation in gold and other brute facts, on the 
other. Cf. Simon Derpmann, Geld als Ware, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MARKET 227, 244 
(Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch ed., 2016). 
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Transformation” that Polanyi studies and pejoratively labels 
“fictitious.”92 
B. IP: A Fiction in What Sense? 
It is not uncommon among legal theorists and historians to claim 
that IP is a “fiction.”93 Such observations are relevant for our 
purposes because they do not relate to IP rights or laws—with 
property in the legal sense94—but to the subject matter of exclusive 
rights, e.g. “the” work, “the” invention, design, sign, etc. (i.e. with 
property in the sense of a good or resource that is owned by 
someone). What Polanyi and the referenced IP theorists thus share 
is an interest in the ontological status of certain resources in a market 
economy. It is, however, not clear whether Polanyi and 
contemporary IP theorists also apply the same definition of 
fictitiousness. As explained, fictitiousness in Polanyian terms means 
that an element of the market economy is not produced for sale but, 
due to a great, “fictitious” transformation, is nevertheless up for sale. 
If one applies this distinction to the subject matter of IP laws and 
IPRs, three transformations (“fictions”) come to the fore. 
1. Information Not Produced for Sale 
The first transformation concerns IP subject matter that was 
originally not produced for sale but created for other purposes. 
This classical Polanyian category must not be confused with the 
always “fictitious” commodification of intellectual or 
entrepreneurial labor sold on labor markets and remunerated by 
wages. For, in general, the individual labor or “knowledge” 
 
92 See Jessop, supra note 15, at 119. 
93 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT 377, 382 (Paul Rabinow & 
Nikolas Rose eds., 2003) (“fiction of the work”); JAMES E. PENNER, IDEA OF PROPERTY 118 
(1992) (“idiotic fiction that intellectual property constitutes property in ideas (patents) or 
expressions”; “in general it does no harm to speak of rights in ideas, or in manuscripts, or 
in marks, any more than it does to refer to one’s rights in one’s labour.”); DRAHOS, supra 
note 67, at 67, 151–56, 211; Hugh Breakey, Properties of Copyright, in CONCEPTS OF 
PROPERTY 137, 152 (Helena R. Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., 2013); Robert H. Rotstein, 
Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 725 (1993); SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 1, at 28; ALAIN POTTAGE & BRAD 
SHERMAN, FIGURES OF INVENTION 4, 7 (2010) (“Intangibility is a figment.”). 
94 See EDELMAN, supra note 53, at 40 (“juridical fiction”). 
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necessary to create the first prototype of a copyrightable work, a 
patentable invention, or a distinctive sign capable of use as a 
trademark is not what IPRs protect.95 Instead, IPRs attach to the 
objective result of an antecedent labor, irrespective of the efforts and 
difficulties that work entailed. It is true that this focus on the result 
conceives of and thus transforms public and personal knowledge 
and intellectual labor into some kind of raw material that is available 
in the public domain and/or on labor markets.96 But this 
transformation occurs with regard to every work and work product 
that is up for sale. It is not a specific feature of IPRs.97 What is more, 
IPRs do not apply retroactively to information that was produced or 
published before the respective IP law came into effect. They thus 
do not change the status of already existing information from being 
owned by no one or belonging to the commons in a private domain.98 
In addition, basic building blocks of human knowledge systems like 
laws of nature, factual information, abstract concepts, scientific 
theories, and mathematical concepts always remain beyond the 
reach of IPRs.99 
There are, however, constellations in which IPRs indeed apply 
to works, inventions, signs etc. that were brought about in non-
market contexts and without the perspective of commercialization. 
Grace periods in patent law are precisely meant to allow for such a 
transformation. According to U.S. patent law, a disclosure made by 
the inventor or joint inventor one year or less before the effective 
filing date of a claimed invention, for example, during an academic 
congress, is not prior art to the claimed invention and thus does not 
 
95 The only exception is the EU right for database producers, which is rightly called a 
“sui generis” right because, in contrast to all other IPRs, it does not attach to a marketable 
artefact/product, but to the substantial investments into a non-original database. Cf. Council 
Directive 96/9, art. 7-11, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. 
96 See JESSOP, supra note 15, at 117. 
97 But see id. at 120 (“knowledge is codified, detached from manual labour, and 
disentangled from material products to acquire independent form in expert systems, 
intelligent machines, or immaterial products and services.”). 
98 See MONIKA KÜPPERS, CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN – PROTECTION OF 
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSION IN THE LIGHT OF RETROACTIVE COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION 60 (2017), Goethe University Frankfurt am Main Dissertation 2018. 
99 Alexander Peukert, A Doctrine of the Public Domain, in THE INNOVATION AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Josef Drexl ed., forthcoming), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2713757 [https://perma.cc/7QVN-B437]. 
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bar later propertization.100 Copyright comes into existence 
automatically and therefore covers each and every artifact 
displaying a modicum of creativity, including countless works 
created for pleasure in completely private settings. If these works 
retain their non-commercial social status, their copyright protection 
does not attain relevance. Thanks to the Internet, however, works 
created in private nowadays often see the light of day and sometimes 
even spark great commercial success. Such a move from fan fiction 
to best seller in itself reorganizes the communicative context from 
non-commercial to commercial.101 More visible and contested 
transformations concern academia and the artistic field. These 
spheres operate separately from the market on the basis of 
autonomous logics of truth and aesthetics and respective allocations 
of reputational gains and losses among academics and artists.102 If 
genuine academic writings and artworks originally created for their 
own sake (“l’art pour l’art”) are later marketed as products up for 
sale, their perception and evaluation change fundamentally. They 
are not valued anymore according to their truth, depth of thought, or 
aesthetic originality but rather according to their market success. 
Depending upon its frequency, such commodification can exhibit 
systemic effects that tend to supplant an open and reciprocal 
“republic of science” and an equally autonomous artistic field with 
profit-oriented transactions.103 In the area of trademark law, finally, 
ex-post-commodification of non-commercial signs concerns 
artworks in the public domain and cultural icons that are later used 
 
100 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2018), with EPC, supra note 68, art. 55(b) (noting 
six months grace period for displays of the invention at an international exhibition). 
101 Except perhaps in the view of literary critics. See Liz Bury, Fifty Shades of Pay: 
Erotica Yarn Sends EL James to Top Spot in Earnings List, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 
2013), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/aug/14/el-james-highest-earning-author 
[https://perma.cc/5C5V-KZNX]. 
102 For information on Academia, see Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its 
Political and Economic Theory, 38 MINERVA 1 (2000); Alexander Peukert, Das Verhältnis 
zwischen Urheberrecht und Wissenschaft: Auf die Perspektive kommt es an!, 4 J. INTELL. 
PROP. INFO. TECH. ELEC. COMM. 142 para. 1 (2013); ACADEMIC CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION (Brendan Cantwell & Ilkka Kauppinen eds., 2014). For information on 
Art, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, RULES OF ART: GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF THE LITERARY 
FIELD (Susan Emanuel trans., 1996); Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Creators and Society’s 
Need for Autonomous Art – the Blessing and Curse of Monetary Incentives, in WHAT IF 
WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017). 
103 See sources cited supra note 102. 
2019] FICTITIOUS COMMODITIES 1179 
 
as signs indicating the origin of a good or service.104 The European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court recently confirmed that, in 
general, trademark protection is available and legitimate in such 
cases, unless there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat of 
“misappropriation or desecration” of the respective work, in which 
case a trademark registration may be refused on the basis of the 
public policy/morality exception.105 
2. Commodifying Communication 
In quantitative terms, these instances of ex-post-
commodification do not, however, justify labeling IP as “fictitious” 
across the board. Much, if not most, IP subject matter is originally 
produced for sale under conditions of the market and thus presents 
a real capitalist commodity in Polanyian terms.106 Suffice it to 
mention patented medicines and other technologies invented within 
private companies for commercial gain, proprietary software, 
entertainment products, phonograms, broadcasting signals, 
databases and other products protected by rights related to 
copyright, industrial designs, and signs created for use as trade 
marks. Industrial property law is even confined to the commercial 
context. Private uses of patented inventions, protected designs, 
trademarks, etc. are beyond the scope of these IPRs.107 Copyright 
does extend to the private sphere but often in the weaker form of a 
right to remuneration (liability rule).108 Thus, many, if not most, 
IPRs institutionalize markets for original commodities. 
This statement is, however, premature because it fails to 
recognize the peculiar communicative character of all inventions, 
works, and signs, irrespective of whether they have been created for 
non-commercial or commercial purposes. Communication is 
 
104 See Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1 
(2008); Martin Senftleben, Free Signs and Free Use, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INTELL. PROP.  354, 357 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015). 
105 See EFTA Court Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo, para. 102. For U.S. law, see 15 
U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2016). See generally Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017). 
106 See Jessop, supra note 15, at 118–19. 
107 Cf. PATENTGESETZ [PATG] [GERMAN PATENT ACT], art. 31 § 11(1), Dec. 16, 1980, 
BGBL I at 1; Community Design Regulation, 6/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1, 6 (EU). 
108 Cf. Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5(2)(b), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1. 
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generally defined as a process in which one person imparts 
something that she knows to another: 
[E]very act of communication requires a sender, a 
message, a medium or channel for its transmission, 
and a recipient who can decipher or decode it. The 
code in which it can be expressed depends on the 
type of decoder the recipient uses to receive, 
comprehend and assimilate it. Homo sapiens is  . . .  
a recipient with a wide variety of decoders.109 
The creation and further use of inventions, works, and 
trademarks always involves such acts of communication. To bring 
about a new technical solution, a creative expression, or a distinctive 
sign, firstly requires an immense amount of personal knowledge on 
the part of a novice innovator that has to be acquired by learning 
about existing technologies, works, brands, etc.110 Secondly, and 
more importantly, the result of this preparatory act of 
communication is itself an artefact that communicates something. 
Most notably, texts, but all other categories of copyrightable works 
too, express information, be it a scientific theory, a story, or another 
visually or aurally perceivable “idea.”111 Immanuel Kant therefore 
characterized printed matter as a dynamic speech of the author 
(opera) and not as an objective thing (opus).112 The German Federal 
Constitutional Court also finds that: 
once a work is published[,] it is no longer at its 
owner’s sole disposal, but enters the social sphere, 
just as it was intended to do, and can thereby become 
an independent factor that helps define the cultural 
 
109 See ECJ Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, Opinion of 
Advocate General Colomer, 2002 E.C.R. I-11737, paras. 19–20. 
110 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“advances, once part of 
our shared knowledge, define a new threshold from which innovation starts once more”); 
see also Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite, 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., Stevens, J., 
& Souter, J., dissenting). 
111 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 9(2). 
112 See IMMANUEL KANT, On the Unlawfulness of Reprinting (1785), reprinted in 
PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900), http://
www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_d_1785 
 [https://perma.cc/982X-SJVR]; ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
COPYING? 8, 16, 113 (2015). 
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and intellectual scene of its era. As over time, the 
work is no longer only subject to disposal under 
private law and becomes common intellectual and 
cultural property, the author must accept that it will 
increasingly serve as a link to an artistic dialogue.113 
The same can be said of patentable inventions. For inventions 
are neither to be equated with a machine or other “dead” artefacts 
nor with a “relation between a person and an object.”114 Instead, 
inventions teach a person having ordinary skill in the art 
(PHOSITA) how to solve a particular problem by making use of 
natural resources and the laws of nature.115 In other words, an 
invention communicates technical information (the message) from 
a sender (the inventor) to a recipient (the PHOSITA). Trademarks, 
finally, also “convey a message.”116 It is their very function to 
inform the public about the origin of a product and to create an 
attractive image.117 
Thus, works, inventions, and trademarks are not static 
commodities produced for consumption but elements of dynamic 
communicative processes. They are derived from the state of the art 
and further conveyed to the public, whose members in turn rely on 
them as the basis for further innovation, creative expression, and 
competition. To treat IP as if it is a marketable good is fictitious 
because such commoditization ignores IP’s embeddedness in 
communication. What is more, the communicative significance of a 
given work, invention, or trademark for the public—and thus its use 
and, eventually, its exchange value—is not produced by the IPR 
holder. All that an author, inventor, or trademark owner can do is to 
 
113 BVerfG, May 31, 2016, NJW 2016, 2247 para. 87 – Metall auf Metall (English 
version: http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20160531_1bvr158513en.html [https://perma.cc
/ZR9X-9KRA]  (emphasis added). 
114 Contra DRASSINOWER, supra note 112, at 64–65. 
115 See BGH Mar. 03, 1969, GRUR 1969, 672 (673) – Rote Taube; BGH Jun. 30, 2015, 
GRUR 2015, 983 para. 27 - Flugzeugzustand (Erfindung als “Lehre zum planmäßigen 
Handeln unter Einsatz beherrschbarer Naturkräfte zur Erreichung eines kausal 
übersehbaren Erfolgs”); BGH Sep. 27, 2016, GRUR 2017, 261, para. 21 – 
Rezeptortyrosinkinase II (“Lehre zum technischen Handeln”). 
116 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017) (“trademarks often consist[ed] of 
catchy phrases that convey a message”). 
117 See Cohen, supra note 17, at 5–6.  
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impart her artistic, technical, or marketing message to the public and 
hope that some recipients will receive, understand, and find interest 
in it. Only in this case is the communication complete and a use 
value created. A book unread, a technical teaching ignored, or a 
trademark not perceived is worth just the paper on which it is 
printed. IP only enters the picture if there is an active recipient. The 
moment when an IP communication is successfully completed is, 
however, not only the moment when exchange value is created but 
also the moment in which a work or other IP subject matter becomes 
“common intellectual and cultural property.”118 This common 
property and sometimes even the meaning of a work or trademark is 
created by members of the public.119 It thus cannot be attributed to 
the author, inventor, or other IPR holder alone. The contrary rule of 
IPR ownership is thus based on a fiction. 
3. Commodifying Artefacts and Actions of Non-owners 
One could still try to defend IP as a “real” commodity in 
Polanyian terms by pointing to IP subject matter that does not 
communicate anything. For example, the rights “related” to the 
copyright of a phonogram of film producers and of broadcasters do 
not attach to a message that a sender imparts to a recipient but to the 
medium or channel employed for the transmission of a piece of 
information, namely to fixations of sounds and moving images, and 
to broadcasting signals.120 If a phonogram, a film carrier, or a 
 
118 See BVerfG, May 31, 2016, NJW 2016, 2247 para. 87 – Metall auf Metall (English 
version: http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20160531_1bvr158513en.html [https://perma.cc
/ZR9X-9KRA]. 
119 See Dev S. Gangjee, Property in Brands, LSE LAW, SOC’Y AND ECON. WORKING 
PAPERS at 1, 19 (Jun. 13, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2249765 [https://perma.cc/D9F2-NE8E] (regarding the consumer understanding of a 
trademark, and unpaid labor of consumers). 
120 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14. Another example of this materialist 
approach concerns plant variety rights that attach to a “plant grouping within a single 
botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespective of whether the 
conditions for the grant of a breeder’s right are fully met, can be defined by the expression 
of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of genotypes, 
distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said 
characteristics and considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated 
unchanged.” See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV), art. 1(vi), Mar. 19, 1991, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 
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broadcasting signal produced for the entertainment market is not a 
“real” commodity, what else will qualify for this category? In 
addition, both this and other IP subject matter, including works, 
inventions, and trademarks, have for a long time been signified and 
regulated as “goods” that can be owned and traded on markets.121 Is 
this absolutely dominant practice not proof enough of the 
ontological adequacy of IP commodification?122 
Well, not if one takes into account that mainstream IP theory 
itself characterizes IPRs as legal institutions creating “artificial 
scarcity” of otherwise “public goods.”123 For to treat public goods 
as if they were private commodities and to execute this 
transformation by legal means is exactly the kind of fictitiousness 
Polanyi had in mind.124 
Yet even this observation does not exhaust the problem. The 
continued talk about “public” goods that, through a legal measure, 
turn into “private” goods neglects and obscures a transformation at 
a deeper level, namely the level of how we collectively conceive of 
reality and regulate human interaction accordingly. The worldview 
I allude to here is the view that IP “goods,” like works, inventions, 
 
https://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/conventions/1991/act1991.html  
[https://perma.cc/B86R-6V2Z]; PEUKERT, supra note 35, at 68. 
121 This is true even for critical observers. See, e.g., DRAHOS, supra note 67, at 156, 212; 
Jessop, supra note 15, at 120 (“non-rival good”). But see Pagano, supra note 85, at 1413 
(“Knowledge is not an object defined in a limited physical space. The same item of 
knowledge can be encoded in multiple languages, using many different objects existing in 
a potentially infinite number of places. For this reason, the full-blown private ownership 
of knowledge means a global monopoly that limits the liberty of many individuals in 
multiple locations.”). 
122 See Maria E. Reicher, Wie aus Gedanken Dinge werden. Eine Philosophie der 
Artefakte, 61 DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE 219, 227 (2013); Andrew Chin, The 
Ontological Function of the Patent Document, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 263 (2012). 
123 See Lemley, supra note 12, at 460 (“In effect, the point of IP laws is to take a public 
good that is naturally nonrivalrous and make it artificially scarce, allowing the owner to 
control how many copies of the good can be made and at what price.”). 
124 See Borghi, supra note 15, at 3–4 (“No law of the market can convert an idea, or a 
poem, or a creation, into a scarce item  . . .  ideas . . .  are not naturally commodities, but 
they are nonetheless treated as if they were commodities . . .  No natural law of the market 
(no ‘invisible hand’) is capable of producing this fiction by itself. The fiction must be 
established as such.”); Jessop, supra note 15, at 120 (“knowledge is collectively produced 
and is not inherently scarce  . . .  it is made artificially scarce and access thereto depends 
on payment of rent”); Pagano, supra note 85, at 1414 (“commons were turned into 
exclusive private property”). 
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brands. etc., exist as distinct objects and that these “goods” can be 
allocated to certain owners in exclusion of all others. The respective 
ontology assumes that IP objects exist as abstract objects (types) 
independently from their instantiations (tokens) in books, products, 
digital files, and other physical or mental manifestations.125 
I have shown elsewhere in detail126 that this ontology is 
implausible because the existence of allegedly abstract IP is always 
dependent upon the existence of at least one physical or mental 
“embodiment.” The dominant paradigm is also untenable from a 
legal perspective because law can legitimately only regulate 
behavior that relates to brute facts that humans are able to control. 
Abstract types exactly defy such control. I also show that the idea of 
the abstract IP object was the result of a quite recent historical 
process, in which signifiers like “the” book, work, or invention 
changed their meaning. Instead of referencing many distinct but 
sufficiently similar artefacts and actions, they henceforth signified 
abstract IP objects. Whereas early modern privileges and still the 
first British patent and copyright statutes regulated exclusive rights 
to print a book or work a machine, today’s paradigm was only 
implemented in full by the French Revolutionary Acts of 1791 and 
1793, which granted exclusive property rights in “ouvrages,” “idée 
nouvelle,” and “découvertes industrielle.” Since then, we have 
treated books, machines, other items with physical existence, and 
public performances as secondary “embodiments” of a primary, 
abstract “intellectual property.” 
The transformation at stake here concerns the dominant 
perception of the world. An idealized world of abstract objects 
superseded a realistic focus on artefacts and actions having brute, 
measurable existence. This fundamental shift occurred solely in our 
language and thinking. The brute facts of artefacts and actions 
 
125 See Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 2(1); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (“embodied”); 
CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L111-3 (Fr.) (“La propriété incorporelle 
définie par l’article L. 111-1 est indépendante de la propriété de l’objet matériel.”); Michael 
J. Madison, The End of the Work As We Know It, 19 U. GEORG. L. J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 
333 (2012) (“The work subject to copyright is solely and purely an intangible thing.”); 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 15–16, 26(1). 
126 See PEUKERT, supra note 35; Paul Duguid, The Aging of Information: From Particular 
to Particulate, 76 UC BERKELEY J. HIST. IDEAS 347 (2015) (regarding information as an 
object). 
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(books, machines, performances) retained their physical existence. 
But they were signified and conceived of differently: not as artefacts 
and actions whose use or occurrence was regulated, but as 
exemplars of an IP object that belonged to someone else. This 
bizarre abstraction is fictitious in the sense that we speak of works, 
inventions, and other IP objects as of tangible commodities, where 
in fact IP objects only exist insofar and because we speak and 
regulate as if they exist as abstract “things” of value. In other words, 
IP objects only exist in our linguistic practice and collective 
imagination.127 From a legal realist perspective, IPRs are exclusive 
rights to prevent or authorize the reproduction and further use of 
certain Master Artefacts.128 And the only reason for the “wild”129 
conceptual move from privileges to act to modern IPRs in abstract 
objects was the commodity function of IP. The emerging market for 
books and other innovative yet easily reproducible products required 
property rights in distinct abstract objects that represented the input 
of authors and inventors.130 
C. Consequences: Dis-embedding Effects of IP 
The market demand for commodification of each and every 
element of production was also the driver for the fictitious 
commodification of labor, land, and money, the commodities 
studied by Polanyi. In his opinion, their transformation into 
commodities produced devastating effects: 
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director 
of the fate of human beings and their natural 
environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of 
purchasing power, would result in the demolition of 
society. For the alleged commodity ‘labor power’ 
cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or 
 
127 Richard Rudner, The Ontological Status of the Esthetic Object, 10 PHIL. AND 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 380 (1950). 
128 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 11, 16, 26, 28 (Members shall provide right 
holders with exclusive rights to “prevent,” “prohibit” or “authorize” certain conduct); 
Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of 
Social Surplus from Creation, 2 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 45 (2005). 
129 See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2357 (Yates, J., dissenting); see also 
SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 1, at 19. 
130 See Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2357 (Yates, J., dissenting). 
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even left unused, without affecting also the human 
individual who happens to be the bearer of this 
peculiar commodity. In disposing of a man’s labor 
power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the 
physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’ 
attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective 
covering of cultural institutions, human beings 
would perish from the effects of social exposure; 
they would die as the victims of acute social 
dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and 
starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, 
neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers 
polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to 
produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, 
the market administration of purchasing power 
would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for 
shortages and surfeits of money would prove as 
disastrous to business as floods and droughts in 
primitive society. Undoubtedly, labor, land, and 
money markets are essential to a market economy. 
But no society could stand the effects of such a 
system of crude fictions even for the shortest stretch 
of time unless its human and natural substance as 
well as its business organization was protected 
against the ravages of this satanic mill.131 
At first sight, the transformation of reproducible artefacts and 
their communicative use to abstract IP objects give less cause for 
such dramatic warnings. In and of itself, the formation and 
expansion of the IP system can hardly be blamed for consequences 
of the magnitude Polanyi describes.132 His analysis is nevertheless 
informative for our purposes because IP exhibits the same dis-
 
131 See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 76–77. 
132 James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 
DUKE L.J. 87, 115 (1997) (“After all, environmental problems could actually destroy the 
biosphere and this is just, well, intellectual property.”). But see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: 
VERSION 2.0, at xv (2d ed. 2006); JOHN NAUGHTON, FROM GUTENBERG TO ZUCKERBERG 
291 (2012); EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION (2011) (Orwell-Huxley scenario 
where global IP champions form a powerful alliance with state actors). 
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embedding ramifications that characterize other fictitious 
commodities.133 What they effectuate is that, “[i]nstead of economy 
being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in 
the economic system.”134 
The dis-embedding impact of IP can be explicated with 
reference to the three features of its fictitiousness introduced above, 
namely its application to information that was not produced for sale, 
the commodification of communicative practices, and, more 
generally, the fictitious treatment of the use of artefacts by non-
owners “remote from the persons or tangibles of the party having 
the right”135 as infringements of a property right in an abstract IP 
object. 
Ex post commodification of artefacts originally created in non-
commercial contexts, such as religion or academia, transplants the 
works or signs into a market setting. Thereby, the respective 
artefacts are dis-embedded from their social roots and integrated 
into an economic order governed by a logic of profitable/non-
profitable. With every expansion of the market, the fields where 
non-market logics of true/false (academia), sacred/profane 
(religion), aesthetic/non-aesthetic (arts), or winning/losing (sports) 
dominate will shrink, and this will attenuate the norms that stabilize 
these fields.136 Whereas some commentators praise this type of 
commodification as the creation of secondary economic meaning, 
others conceive of it as a corruptive force that supplants traditional 
lifeworlds.137 
 
133 See Boyle, supra note 132, at 115. 
134 See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 60. 
135 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J., 
concurring); Pagano, supra note 85, at 1414 (2014) (“the holders of property rights on 
knowledge  . . .  can decide whether a certain production process can be undertaken in a 
particular country”). 
136 See Jessop, supra note 15, at 120. 
137 Compare Megan Richardson, Trade Marks and Language, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 193, 
213 (2004), with MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE. INTELL. PROP. AND 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 2, 5 (2012) (IP “bears fundamentally on the basic activities that make for 
a full and joyful life” in a culture that is not understood as an accumulation of goods but as 
a “process of creative and social interaction”). On the transformation of football clubs from 
sports associations to entertainment companies and the role of trademark law in this 
transformation, see ECJ Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club v. Matthew Reed, Opinion 
of Advocate General Colomer, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, para 79. 
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The more general insight that patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks split up dynamic, interconnected processes of 
communication into separate pieces of information that may be 
imparted, received, and further used only upon prior authorization 
by the right holder points to a generally disruptive potential of IPRs 
for society at large. Communication, as defined above, is 
doubtlessly a central, if not the specific, feature of human 
societies.138 The more information that is covered by IPRs, the less 
communication of technical teachings, expressions of various sorts, 
and brand images can occur spontaneously and without regard to 
exclusive rights of others. Taken to the extreme, the interruptions 
caused by IPRs would bring communication and, thus, societal 
exchange effectively to a halt or reconfigure today’s society to a 
nightmarish system where only those are allowed to speak and act 
are those who can afford it.139 Unfortunately, one can observe 
instances where this risk flashes up. Patent and other IPR thickets 
stifle economic competition (which is part of, and embedded in, 
society);140 digital copyright law remodels heterarchical networks 
where everyone can speak publicly (e.g. user-generated content 
platforms) into closed, hierarchically structured, and fully licensed 
services;141 and contemporary trademark law reinforces 
consumption as the primary meaning of life.142 
The third and final aspect of the fictitiousness of IP, namely the 
fiction of the abstract IP object, ignores the 
innovative/entrepreneurial process leading to IP as well as 
imitative/repetitive activity and follow-on innovation, which IP law 
 
138 See LUHMANN, supra note 37, at 80. 
139 See SUNDER, supra note 137, at 5 (regarding the continuity of societal and cultural 
exchange as an end in itself).  
140 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP 
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2010); Barton Beebe & Jeanne 
C. Fromer, Are We Running out of Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark 
Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945 (2018). Regarding the financial system, 
cf. Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End?, 87 NEW LEFT REV. 35, 51 (2014) 
(“excessive commodification of money. . . brought down the global economy in 2008”). 
141 See Alexander Peukert, Copyright and the Two Cultures of Online Comm., in INTELL. 
PROP. L. AND HUMAN RIGHTS 367 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 3rd ed. 2015); Parliament and 
Council Directive 2019/790, art. 17, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92. 
142 See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 157 (“cultural void”); RICHARDSON, supra note 137, at 
215–16. See generally ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, CONSUMING LIFE (2007).  
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treats as either illegal or exceptionally lawful for reasons that again 
lie beyond IP law, e.g. the freedom of information and competition. 
This willful disregard of the reality that IPRs regulate (i.e. the 
production, reproduction, and further use of artefacts remote from 
the right holder) fosters abstract talk about fictitious objects and 
problems, e.g. a systematic lack of incentive to innovate or invest in 
ever larger segments of the market economy. At the same time, the 
dominant paradigm obscures the aforementioned disruptive 
potential of IPRs within and beyond the economy. It falsely suggests 
that IPRs allocate objects just like other exclusive property rights, 
whereas, in fact, IPRs are exclusive privileges to act in certain ways 
with regard to certain artefacts.143 
III. COUNTERMOVEMENTS: FROM OBJECTS TO ARTEFACTS AND 
ACTIONS 
The fiction that IPRs apply to objects that are ready for 
commodification, like land and other tangibles, furthermore 
obfuscates the fact that IPRs not only form the basis of “free” 
markets but also possess a strong protectionist element in that they 
allow IPR holders and their respective home countries to leverage 
market power. This feature explains why the acceptance and 
expansion of IPRs gained momentum at the very moment the free 
trade era, which had brought about the fictitious commodification of 
labor, land, and money, came to an end in the 1870s.144 Historically 
and functionally, IPRs are thus located at the transition from early 
19th century commodification and laissez-faire capitalism to late 
19th century countermovements. 
It would, however, be a mistake to qualify IPRs as a 
countermovement measure in Polanyian terms. The 
countermovements Polanyi studies are self-protective measures of 
society at large against the destructive effects of the fictitious 
commodification of labor and land. Their purpose is to re-embed 
 
143 See PEUKERT, supra note  35. 
144 Compare POLANYI, supra note 7, at 19 (“by the end of the seventies the free trade 
episode (1846–79) was at an end”) and DALE, supra note 10, at 86 (discussing German 
tariff politics in the 1870s), with SECKELMANN, supra note 2, at 155, 169–170, 415 
(discussing the formation of international patent law in the 1870s and 1880s). 
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these commodities and the respective markets into society and the 
environment, with the ultimate aim to guarantee the continued 
existence of man and nature. These policies were implemented by 
labor, social security, and early environmental protection laws.145 IP 
laws differ from these regulations both teleologically and 
structurally. Their primary aim is not to control market forces but to 
integrate innovative and entrepreneurial activity into the market 
system. To this end, they grant individual owners private rights in 
fictitious goods.146 The effect of this measure is exactly the opposite 
of Polanyi’s countermovements, namely the separation of ever 
larger segments of technical, artistic, and other communication from 
the rest of society. 
Accordingly, analogies to Polanyi’s countermovements in the 
area of IP are to be found beyond IPRs. Respective norms are 
characterized by the purpose of re-embedding IP subject matter into 
commercial and non-commercial societal exchange that occurs 
spontaneously and irrespective of prior authorization 
requirements.147 Rules with this aim are scattered across various 
legal fields, ranging from contract and competition law to 
fundamental rights. In contrast to social security/labor and 
environmental protection laws, they still lack a coherent legal and 
theoretical basis. The most aspirational proposal along these lines, 
and, unsurprisingly also the one most closely tied to Polanyi’s 
theory, is James Boyle’s call for a “cultural environmentalism.”148 
A. The Contested Boundaries of IPRs 
Commodification and countermovements clash at the 
boundaries of IPRs. The limits of exclusivity demarcate the realm 
of IP markets on the one hand and the realm of spontaneous societal 
communication and exchange based on everyone’s equal negative 
liberty to copy and otherwise use reproducible artefacts on the other. 
 
145 See POLANYI, supra note 7, at 171. 
146 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, at preamble. 
147 On the integration of the TRIPS Agreement into general international law, see 
HENNING GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, THE PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. IN INT’L L. ch. 12–13 
(2016). 
148 See Boyle, supra note 132; Boyle, supra note 16, at 53, 69; ROBERT CUNNINGHAM, 
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTALISM (2014). 
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The expansion of one system necessarily reduces the scope of the 
other. Thus, advances to push the boundaries in any direction are 
always fights over all or nothing. Since IPRs are “creatures of 
statute,”149 respective debates primarily take place in the political 
and legislative sphere.150 The conflict between the forces of 
commodification and opposing movements resurfaces when the 
boundaries of IP laws and rights are contested before courts and 
other tribunals. On both the macro and the micro level, continuous 
efforts are undertaken to sustain unauthorized communication and 
competition or even to re-embed commodified information into 
spontaneous societal exchange. These countermovements can again 
be classified according to the three aspects of the fictitiousness of 
IP.151 
The resistance against the commodification of reproducible 
artefacts that are not primarily produced for sale but first and 
foremost for other purposes (IP fiction No. 1) is mostly brought up 
as an issue of public interest, policy, or morality. In this regard, 
international and EU IP law grant nation states a wide range of 
discretion so as to enable them to integrate the global innovation and 
brand markets into a local society that avoids serious prejudice to 
the environment and provides protection for all life forms and public 
health.152 As a consequence, inventions remain unpatentable in the 
EU that require the prior destruction of human embryos or their use 
as base material.153 Trademark registrations can be denied on the 
ground that a sign is contrary to public policy or accepted principles 
 
149 See Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, para. 25 
(Can.); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 662–63 (1834) (“This right . . .does not exist at 
common law—it originated, if at all, under the acts of congress.”); BVerfG Jul. 15, 1981, 
58 BVerfGE 300 (330) - Naßauskiesung (“The legislature creates on the level of objective 
laws those provisions which establish the legal position of the owner”). 
150 See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
151 Supra Section II.B. 
152 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 8(1), 27(2); World Trade Organization, 
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 
755 (2002) (“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public health.”); CJEU Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. 
Greenpeace, 2011 E.C.R. I-9821, para. 29. 
153 See CJEU Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace, 2011 E.C.R. I-9821, para. 49.  
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of morality,154 and the international copyright system does not in 
any way affect a government’s right to censor copyright-protected 
speech for reasons of the local public order.155 Numerous copyright 
statutes and doctrines serve to protect academia and the artistic field 
from being completely transformed into segments of the market 
where the ability to participate in academic or artistic exchange 
would depend solely on one’s ability to buy and sell. In this regard, 
reference can be made to the universal public domain status of 
factual information, scientific theories, mathematical concepts, and 
artistic styles156; further limitations and exceptions for purposes of 
research and education;157; and the case law of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court calling for an “art-specific” interpretation of 
copyright that would allow for “an artistic dialogue with existing 
works, without being subject to financial risks or restrictions in 
terms of content.”158 
Numerous further limitations and exceptions aim at cabining IP 
fiction No. 2, namely the splitting up of technical, artistic, academic, 
and commercial communication into single commodified objects. 
To avoid the permanent disruption and potential breakdown of 
communication and competition because of IP-related authorization 
requirements, the law exempts acts done privately and for non-
commercial purposes from the scope of IPRs either completely or 
 
154 See Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/1001, art. 7(1)(f), 2017 O.J. (L 154) 1,  
[hereinafter EUTMReg 2017/1001]; EUTMDir 2015/2436, supra note 6, art. 4(1)(f), 2015 
O.J. (L 336) 1, 7; EFTA Court Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 6, March 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 
1372; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 15(2); Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017). 
155 See Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 17; Panel Report, China – Measures 
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intell. Prop. Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 
2009), paras. 7.120-7.139. 
156 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 9(2). 
157 See also WIPO, Limitations and Exceptions, 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/limitations [https://perma.cc/9CFX-4EEY] (regarding 
copyright limitations and exceptions amongst various countries); cf. Kenneth D. Crews, 
Study on Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, WIPO (Nov. 
2, 2017), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_35/sccr_35_6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3KA4-D52B].  
158 Cf. BVerfG May 31, 2016, 142 BVerfGE 74, paras. 86–87 – Sampling (English 
version available at: http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20160531_1bvr158513en.html 
[https://perma.cc/4TRV-S42A]). For a similar result based on a general de minimis 
limitation of copyright, see VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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subjects them only to a levy.159 IP laws furthermore declare 
admissible acts done for experimental purposes,160 quotations,161 
hyperlinks to works freely available on another website,162 and 
comparative advertising and other referential uses of protected 
trademarks, if such commercial communication is otherwise in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial 
matters.163 
Fiction No. 3, the abstract IP object, is the most fundamental 
one. It treats certain activities, namely the employment of third 
parties’ own reproduction technologies (think of your computer) and 
their cognitive capacities, as if these activities, which occur 
remotely from the IPR holder, constitute trespass upon a private 
property owned by that person. Countermovements taking aim at 
this basic fiction defend the general freedom to copy/imitate and to 
use/perform copies/imitations, even if highly innovative 
technologies, creative expression, and distinctive trademarks are 
concerned.164 Legal measures to this end are less thematically 
focused than rules that protect information from ex post 
commodification and instruments preventing or softening 
 
159 Cf. Community Design Regulation 6/2002, art. 20(1)(a), 2002 O.J. (L 3) 2, 7 (EU); 
GERMAN PATENT ACT § 11 No. 1; Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5(2)(b), 
2001 O.J. (L 167) 1. But see, as a counter-move of the forces of commodification, 
Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6(4), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1 (stating DRM 
systems trump digital private copy exemption). 
160 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (Story, J.: “it could 
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a 
machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the 
sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 
F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002); GERMAN PATENT ACT § 11 No. 2, 2a, 2b; Community 
Design Regulation 6/2002, art. 20(1)(b), 2002 O.J. (L 3) 2, 7 (EU). 
161 See Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 10(1). 
162 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007); CJEU 
Case C-160/15, GS Media v. Sanoma, ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, paras. 40–41. 
163 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
23:11 (5th ed. 2017); Parliament and Council Directive 2006/114, art. 4, O.J. (L 376) 21, 
23; EUTMDir 2015/2436, supra note 6, art. 14; EUTMReg 2017/1001, supra note 154, 
art. 12. Regarding the limits of these countermovements, see ECJ Case C-206/01, Arsenal 
Football Club v. Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, para. 51; ECJ Case C-487/07 
L’Oréal v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185. 
164 EFTA Court Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo, para. 65 (“The considerations 
relating to the public domain also serve, to some extent, the general interest in protecting 
creations of the mind from commercial greed . . .  and in ensuring the freedom of the arts.”). 
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disruptions of communication caused by IPRs. Opposition against 
IP fiction No. 3 is also of a more radical kind because it questions 
the very object status of IP and stresses the liberty-inhibiting effects 
of IPRs. Boundaries of IPRs that reflect these kind of 
countermovements include: 
 the territoriality principle, which secures that 
States can adjust the level of IP protection to their 
local socio-economic conditions165; 
 the first-sale doctrine/exhaustion principle, 
which allows for the free circulation of tangible 
exemplars that were put on the market with the 
consent of the IPR holder166; 
 the freedom of transit of goods and, more 
generally, the principle of free trade in goods and 
services under WTO law167; 
 the time limitation of all IPRs in innovation168; 
 and the requirement of continuous genuine use of 
a trademark, which confirms the embeddedness 
of this particular right “in the system of 
undistorted competition.”169 
Last but not least, countermovements against IP fiction No. 3 are 
also voiced in the Grundnorm of the IP system, which is not 
ownership as in real property but non-ownership. As long as and 
insofar as there are no applicable IPRs in the books, equal negative 
 
165 See Alexander Peukert, Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property 
Law, in BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNAT’L LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 189–228 (Günther Handl et al. eds., Queen Mary Studies in Int’l L. No. 
11, 2012). 
166 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 6; Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, 
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013). 
167 See GROSSE RUSE-KHAN, supra note 147, ch. 10; but see EUTMDir 2015/2436, supra 
note 6, art. 10(4); EUTMReg 2017/1001, supra note 154, art. 9(4) (transit as trademark 
infringement). 
168 See PEUKERT, supra note 35. 
169 CJEU Case C-689/15, W.F. Gözze Frottierweberei v. Verein Bremer Baumwollbörse, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:434, para. 37; ECJ Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club v. Matthew 
Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, para. 48; 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2) (2002) (discussing 
abandonment of mark). 
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liberty to copy and imitate artefacts reigns.170 Accordingly, 
prospective IPR holders face an uphill battle if they want to establish 
or expand a privileged position vis-à-vis the world. They carry the 
burden of proof that an IPR is warranted.171 
B. Commons Regimes 
The fiction of the abstract IP object has become, however, so 
self-evident and powerful that it has forced all countermovements 
onto the defensive. Nowadays, it is often the public domain that 
needs justification in political battles and in court, not its limitation 
through new or expanded IPRs.172 Much more often than not have 
expansionist efforts been successful.173 
When commodification continued and even accelerated in the 
digital age, civil society initiatives tried to counter and even reverse 
this trend. The paradigmatic example in this regard is the Free and 
Open Source Software (FOSS) movement, which inspired similar 
initiatives in other creative sectors (Creative Commons) and in 
academia (Open Access).174 All of these movements strive to realize 
the emancipatory potential of the digital, near-zero-marginal-cost 
 
170 EFTA Court Case E-5/16, Municipality of Oslo, para. 66 (stating that “protection is 
the exception to the rule that creative content becomes part of the public domain once 
communicated”). 
171 See Peukert, supra note 99, at para. 43. 
172 See, e.g., Mireille van Eechoud et al., Statement from EU Academics on Proposed 
Press Publishers’ Right, INST. FOR INFO. L., UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.ivir.nl/academics-against-press-publishers-right/ [https://perma.cc/67JR-
2CLS]; CJEU Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein v. Wullems, ECLI:EU:C:2017:300, para. 62 
with further references (limitations to copyright “must be interpreted strictly”). 
173 See William Cornish, The Expansion of Intellectual Property Rights, in GEISTIGES 
EIGENTUM IM DIENSTE DER INNOVATION 9 (Gerhard Schricker et al. eds., 2001). For a rare 
example of a successful countermovement, see LEE, supra note 5; Gracz, supra note 34, at 
267. 
174 See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY (3d ed. 2015); YOCHIA 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); Yochia Benkler, Law, Innovation, and 
Collaboration in Networked Economy and Society, 13 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 231 (2017); 
UNDERSTANDING KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 
2007); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism and Constructed 
Commons, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (2007); Cohen, supra note 17, at 14.; GOVERNING 
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 86 (Brett M. Frischmann et al. eds., 2014); ERIC V. HIPPEL, FREE 
INNOVATION (2017). On the significance of commons production in the area of brands and 
consumption, see Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 
HARV. L. REV 809, 884–88 (2010). 
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age by establishing networks of commons-based peer production. 
Production in these networks does not follow the logic of the market, 
where all input and output is separately exchanged for money. 
Instead, authors of software, music, and academic writings—the 
very beneficiaries of IPRs—allow unspecified others to access and 
use their works. This generosity is sometimes coupled with a 
requirement of reciprocity, called “copyleft.” According to this rule, 
she who uses free or open content is obliged to make her additions 
and modifications available to everyone under the same free/open 
conditions that she has benefited from. In this case, copyright is not 
simply waived or granted royalty-free but actively used as a tool to 
turn exclusivity into inclusivity. Copyleft licenses are meant to 
expand the realm of non-market communication and innovation and 
shield the intellectual commons from the infiltration of proprietary 
content and the market mode of exchange. In support of this 
alternative mode of communication, the German legislature has 
exempted open-content licenses from author-protective rules that 
address market-related risks of exploitation, and it has furthermore 
preserved the right of publicly funded academic authors to make 
journal articles available on Open Access repositories, even if they 
have already granted commercial publishers an exclusive license for 
the complete copyright term.175 
The quantitative and qualitative significance and sustainability 
of commons-based production is, however, not beyond doubt.176 
Formal, open-content licenses are rarely enforced in court and 
involve major, if not insurmountable, legal obstacles, for example, 
if the license model that governs a massive project like Wikipedia is 
to be amended or replaced.177 It thus seems that open-content 
 
175 Cf. German Copyright Act §§ 31a, 32, 32a, 32c (regarding the grant of an 
unremunerated non-exclusive exploitation right for every person); German Copyright Act, 
§ 38(4); Dutch Copyright Act, Sept. 23, 1912, Sec. 25fa. See generally Dirk Visser, The 
Open Access provision in Dutch Copyright Contract Law, 6 GRUR INT. 534 (2015). 
176 See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1751, 
1814 (2010) (“illusion of the commons”); Primavera De Filippi & Miguel Said Viera, 
supra note 13. 
177 Cf. FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE (FOSS) AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE LICENSE 
MODELS (Axel Metzger ed., 2016); Dan Wielsch, Governance of Massive Multiauthor 
Collaboration - Linux, Wikipedia, and Other Networks: Governed by Bilateral Contracts, 
2019] FICTITIOUS COMMODITIES 1197 
 
licenses are primarily of symbolic bearing in that they signal legality 
in extremely fluid and anonymous communication contexts. 
Ultimately, a dynamic sharing culture cannot be founded on the 
basis of the classic, bilateral contract that legalizes market 
transactions.178 
In addition, there are countless texts, images, films, etc. 
available on the Internet, the copyright status of which is not 
clarified or is, at best, signalled with a ©. This content is 
spontaneously accessed and shared, in particular via hyperlinks, 
without regard to the authorization requirement that copyright 
establishes. In order to bring this societal practice in line with digital 
copyright or, in Polanyian terms, in order to embed copyright into 
digital society, courts have resorted to the doctrine of implied 
consent. In light of the “public interest in the well-functioning of the 
Internet,” the German Federal Court of Justice has held that a right-
holder who makes texts or images available on the Internet without 
access or copy controls implicitly consents to the “normal uses 
according to the circumstances.” In other words, she who 
voluntarily participates in an unrestricted mode of communication 
is thereby subject to the fundamental rules allowing for this non-
market mode of exchange to occur.179 Contrary to predominantly 
critical comments in the literature, the court deserves due respect for 
this courageous legal innovation. With the doctrine of implied 
consent, it legalizes social norms by a legal measure, which is 
adequately informal, flexible, and globally effective—just like the 
communication to which it applies.180 
 
Partnerships, or Something in Between?, 1 J. OF INTELL. PROP., INFO., TECH., & 
ELECTRONIC COM. L.  96 (2010). 
178 Cf. Severine Dusollier, Sharing Access to Intellectual Property Through Private 
Ordering, 82 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1391, 1394 (2007). 
179 See BGH July 17, 2003, GRUR 2003, 958 (961–62) – Paperboy; BGH Apr. 29, 2010, 
GRUR 2010, 628 paras. 28 – Vorschaubilder I; see also CJEU Case C-466/12, Nils 
Svensson v. Retriever Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2014:76. 
180 See generally Alexander Peukert, Der digitale Urheber, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ARTUR-
AXEL WANDTKE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG, 459 (Winfried Bullinger et al. eds., 2013); contra 
Martin Senftleben, Internet Search Results – A Permissible Quotation?, 235 RIDA 2, 59 
(2013). 
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CONCLUSION 
This article offers an explanation for the striking dynamic of the 
IP system, which is at the same time expanding rapidly and severely 
contested. To this end, it makes use of theoretical concepts Karl 
Polanyi set out in his ground-breaking study, “The Great 
Transformation.” As has been elaborated in Parts I-III supra, the 
history of IP can be told in terms of Polanyi’s famous “double 
movement.” Efforts to commodify virtually every reproducible 
input/output face equally persistent opposition that points out the 
disruption IPRs inflict upon communication and competition. 
Whereas IPRs dis-embed informational artefacts from the 
uninterrupted flow of societal exchange and subject them to prior 
authorization requirements, IP countermovements call for their re-
embedding, i.e. their usability irrespective of authorization. At the 
heart of the struggle between market and society lies the ontological 
question of how to understand the subject matter of IPRs. 
Proponents of commodification assume that IP presents an object, 
which in principle lends itself to propertization like land and other 
goods, whereas their opponents perceive IP as an integral part of 
communication and thus society. According to the latter view, IP 
falls into Polanyi’s category of fictitious commodities. I agree with 
this qualification because IPRs, in part, attach to information that 
was not produced for sale; they partition communication into 
commodified pieces, and they are grounded on the obscure fiction 
of the abstract IP object.181 
A Polanyian perspective on IP teaches further lessons. One 
implication concerns IP theory. Whereas there is considerable 
theory on IPRs and a well-established layman’s understanding of 
these rights, countermovements and their traces in the law have long 
been neglected.182 No comprehensive branch of law exists 
comparable to labor or environmental laws that systematically 
addresses the interests represented by the public domain and by 
commons regimes. Rules and provisions on point are scattered 
across IP statutes, competition law, and other laws. There is no 
 
181 See supra Sections II.B.1–II.B.3. 
182 See Cohen, supra note 17, at 14 (“The relationship between commons and property-
based notions of exclusivity is complex and underexplored.”). 
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generally accepted theory on what characterizes the public domain 
and the intellectual commons and how the two phenomena relate to 
each other.183 Although this is not the place to enter into this debate, 
a Polanyian perspective can also inform this theoretical debate. For 
if IPRs execute the forces of commodification, they cannot at the 
same time implement the opposite.184 The notion of “user rights” 
equally misses the point that private rights legalize and enforce 
individual, not public, interests.185 Instead, an adequate legal theory 
of IP countermovements has to explicate that certain reproducible 
artefacts belong to everyone (communitarian approach) or that no 
one can claim ownership (libertarian approach).186 
The last-mentioned alternative finally points to normative 
implications of a Polanyian theory of IP. In the final section of the 
“Great Transformation,” Polanyi muses about a complex, 
industrialized society, in which labor, land, and money are removed 
from the market and subjected to central planning, but, at the same 
time, the rights of the individual are strengthened and thus freedom 
increased. He pins his hopes on a kind of “third way” that avoids the 
pitfalls of both 19th century liberalism and oppressive 
fascism/socialism.187 
The repeated failure of socialist regimes in terms of both 
economic efficiency and individual freedom exposes these hopes, 
however, as utopian and even dangerous. The society that arguably 
came closest to Polanyi’s ideal has been the post-WWII Welfare 
State that adhered to the commodification of labor and land but 
 
183 See Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 
785 (2006); Séverine Dusollier, Inclusivity in Intellectual Property, in INTELL. PROP. & 
GEN. LEGAL PRINCIPLES: IS IP A LEX SPECIALIS?, 101, 106 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 
2015). 
184 See POLANYI, supra note 7; Alexander Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for the 
Digital Network Environment, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005); Dan Wielsch, 
Relationales Urheberrecht: Die vielen Umwelten des Urheberrechts, 5 INTELL. PROP. J. 
274 (2013). Contra Senftleben, supra note 102 (copyright is a neutral mechanism). 
185 See CHRISTOPH MENKE, KRITIK DER RECHTE 32 (2015). Contra, e.g., Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22–30 
(2004). 
186 ALEXANDER PEUKERT, DIE GEMEINFREIHEIT 49–50 (2012). 
187 POLANYI, supra note 7, at 147 (“Freedom in a Complex Society”). 
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greatly intensified distributional interventions in the market by the 
state.188 
Regarding contemporary IP policy, these normative findings 
suggest that extreme versions of either commodification or 
countermovements are to be avoided because over-commodification 
would disrupt and potentially bring to an end spontaneous 
communication, competition, and innovation,189 whereas repealing 
IPRs altogether would deny personal competence and threaten 
individual liberty and market-based efficiency.190 Instead, IP law 
and policy should ensure that market-based transactions coexist with 
non-market modes of accessing and sharing information so that 
authors, inventors, and other entrepreneurs have as many options as 
possible at hand, and all members of society possess adequate 
possibilities to acquire knowledge.191 The principle of coexistence 
of property and non-ownership/commons regimes implies that 
neither alternative may be allowed to oust the other. By 
implementing a permanent coexistence of the two, the law would 
properly reflect upon the peculiar nature of the subject matter of IP, 
which concerns not distinct property objects but the copying and 
further use of reproducible artefacts. Whether and to what extent 
respective exclusive rights to act are warranted will remain a 
controversial political issue, and rightly so.192 
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